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FOR GOODNESS’ SAKE:  
A TWO-PART PROPOSAL FOR REMEDYING THE UNITED 
STATES CHARITY/JUSTICE IMBALANCE 
Fran Quigley 
The approach to addressing economic and social needs in the 
United States strongly favors individual and corporate charity 
over the establishment and enforcement of economic and social 
rights. This charity/justice imbalance has a severely negative 
impact on the nation’s poor, who struggle with inadequate 
access to healthcare, housing, and nutrition, despite high overall 
U.S. wealth. This article suggests a two-part approach for 
remedying the charity/justice imbalance in the United States. 
First, the U.S. should eliminate the charitable tax deduction, a 
policy that does not effectively address economic and social 
needs, forces an inequitable poverty relief and tax burden on the 
middle class, and lulls the nation into a false sense of 
complacency about its poverty crisis. Second, the U.S. should 
replace the deduction with ratification of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. This two-
part process would reverse the U.S. legacy of avoiding 
enforceable commitments to economic and social rights. Charity 
would take a step back and justice a step forward. 
INTRODUCTION 
HEN I worked for our local legal services program here in Indi-
ana, we often represented clients who had profound disabilities or 
severe illnesses, but were unable to obtain the medicine and care they 
had been prescribed.1 Our state government provides very limited access 
to the health insurance program Medicaid, so these clients’ applications 
were routinely rejected.  
Once, when one of my colleagues helped a client file an appeal of 
such a decision, he groaned when the case was assigned to a judge who 
was known for his outspoken contempt of “welfare.” The judge listened 
to a full hour of evidence about the woman’s chronic pain and struggles 
to afford medication and therapy. Then, he promptly denied her request 
for Medicaid coverage. The woman left the courtroom in tears.  
Her lawyer started packing up his files to leave as well. The judge 
lingered for a moment, and broke from his stoic demeanor. “It really is 
too bad what she is going through,” he said to my colleague. “Isn’t there 
some kind of program out there to help people like her?” 
1 Portions of this article were originally published in Fran Quigley, The Limits of 
Philanthropy: Time to Eliminate the Charitable Tax Deduction, COMMONWEAL (Jan. 8, 
2015),https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/limits-philanthropy?utm_content= 
buffere963d&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campacign=buffer. 
W 
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The judge meant a charity program, and the answer is no. The wom-
an was in need of expensive healthcare, not to mention housing and food, 
and her needs were likely to be permanent. Every free clinic director or 
homeless shelter staffer I have ever known would tell the judge that their 
efforts are no substitute for a reliable social safety net, or living wage 
employment, but that judge is just one of many people who disfavor 
such government programs.2 Instead, they possess a comforting belief in 
a mythical “program out there,” a charity that will bridge the gap be-
tween grinding poverty and a safe, healthy existence.3   
This view on the effectiveness of charitable programs is a peculiarly 
American one. Compared to the U.S., other developed countries devote 
far more government funds to meet social needs. The U.S. spends about 
20% of its gross domestic product on government assistance with essen-
tials like healthcare, food, and housing.4 Most other democratic, market-
based countries spend significantly more. Germany, for example, spends 
25% of its GDP on government-provided assistance; the United King-
dom almost 24%.5  
Over the past seventy years, the global community has embraced the 
idea of the human right to basic life necessities. The Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, adopted in 1948, strongly affirms each individu-
al’s entitlement to food, medical care, and an adequate standard of liv-
ing. 6  The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (“ICESR”) followed, creating enforceable rights out of the Uni-
2 Many Americans hold a view that government welfare programs actually increase 
U.S. poverty. See Erin McClam, Many Americans Blame ‘Government Welfare’ for Per-
sistent Poverty, Poll Finds, NBC NEWS (June 6, 2013, 2:18 PM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/in-plain-sight/many-americans-blame-government-
welfare-persistent-poverty-poll-finds-v18802216 (When provided a list of eight factors 
and asked to choose the one most responsible for the continuing problem of poverty, the 
factor that was chosen by 24 percent of respondents, the highest total of all factors, was 
“too much government welfare that prevents initiative.”); see also Jeffrey M. Jones, 
Americans Say Federal Gov’t Wastes Over Half of Every Dollar, GALLUP, (Sept. 19, 
2011),http://www.gallup.com/poll/149543/americans-say-federal-gov-wastes-half-every-
dollar.aspx (“Americans have become increasingly likely to see all levels of government 
as being wasteful of tax dollars.”). 
3 Three-Fourths of Americans Favor Charitable Tax Deduction: Survey Indicates 
Any Changes to System Would Face Strong Opposition, DUNHAM & CO. (Feb. 7, 2012), 
http://dunhamandcompany.com/2012/02/three-fourths-of-americans-favor-charitable-
tax-deduction/ (reporting survey results of 73% of Americans believing that private non-
profits are better than the government at promoting the social good). 
4  ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD 
FACTBOOK 2014: ECONOMIC, ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL STATISTICS (2014), 
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/factbook-2014-90-en/index.html?content 
Type=&itemId=%2fcontent%2fchapter%2ffactbook-2014-90-en&mimeType= 
text%2fhtml&containerItemId=%2fcontent%2fserial%2f18147364&accessItemIds=. 
5 Id. 
6  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III), at art. 25 (Dec. 10, 1948).  
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versal Declaration’s statements of principle.7  But the notion of those so-
called “positive” rights, which call on the government to take action for 
economic and social welfare, has not taken root in the U.S.8 Americans 
cherish their constitutionally protected “negative” rights, the ones that 
protect against government interference in speech, religious expression, 
and privacy.9 But, compared to other industrialized democracies, the U.S. 
is resistant to social entitlements.10 The majority of the world’s countries, 
including every other western industrialized nation, has agreed to the 
ICESCR.11 The United States has refused to ratify it.12  
It is not that Americans are hard-hearted. In contrast to the country’s 
relative stinginess in spending government resources on social needs, its 
citizens have been singled out for being more charitable than their coun-
terparts in similar nations.13 On average, Americans donate nearly 2% of 
their overall income to nonprofit organizations,14 and over 80% of U.S. 
households report making such gifts.15 As a result, nonprofits are a big 
part of the U.S. culture and economy. Not only does the United States 
count on them to meet many social needs that in other countries are pro-
vided by the state, nonprofit organizations employ one in every ten 
members of the U.S. workforce. 16 
7 G.A. Res. 2200A, at 49, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 
(1966). 
8 See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1969). 
The philosopher Isaiah Berlin articulated a difference between civil and political rights, 
which block the government from taking certain actions against individuals, and eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights, which require government action, as a contrast between 
positive and negative liberties. Others have since pointed out that the difference between 
the two categories of rights is often overstated; see infra note 265. 
9  See, e.g., ARYEH NEIER, THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT: A 
HISTORY, 62–86 (2012) (discussing the nature of rights).  
10 But see infra note 138 for discussion of economic and social entitlements created 
by U.S. legislative and state constitutional mandates.  
11 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, Status of Ra-
tifications of ICESCR, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx? 
src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&lang=en.  
12 Id. 
13  See CHARITIES AND FOUNDATION, WORLD GIVING INDEX 2014 (Nov., 
2014),https://www.cafonline.org/docs/default-source/about-us-publications/ 
caf_wgi2014_report_1555awebfinal.pdf (“The U.S is the only country to rank in the Top 
10 for all three kinds of giving covered by the World Giving Index: helping a stranger 
(1st), volunteering time (joint 5th) and donating money (9th).”). 
14 Suzanne Perry, The Stubborn 2% Giving Rate: Even As More Fundraisers Seek 
Donations, Americans Don’t Dig Deeper, THE CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, (June 17, 
2013), http://philanthropy.com/article/The-Stubborn-2-Giving-Rate/139811/. 
15 Most Americans Practice Charitable Giving, Volunteerism, GALLUP (Dec. 13, 
2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/166250/americans-practice-charitable-giving-
volunteerism.aspx.  
16  CENTER FOR CIVIL SOCIETY, HOLDING THE FORT: NONPROFIT EMPLOYMENT 
DURING A DECADE OF TURMOIL 3 (2012), http://ccss.jhu.edu/wp-content/uploads/ 
downloads/2012/01/NED_National_2012.pdf. 
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The prominent role that individual charity plays in the United States 
is both enduring and celebrated. Famously, Alexis de Tocqueville 
swooned over the early 19th century American predilection for forming 
voluntary organizations.17 In the years since, the country has created a 
market-oriented system of providing services via thousands of individual 
charities funded by discretionary donations.18 Americans get to vote with 
their wallets on what kind of support they wish to provide for the poor, 
an arrangement that has proven to be a good fit for the individualistic 
culture of the United States.19 Applause for charity and volunteerism is a 
staple of U.S. political rhetoric across the ideological spectrum. Presi-
dent George H. W. Bush had his “Thousand Points of Light;”20 President 
Barack Obama promotes “United We Serve.”21 In 1981, President Ro-
nald Reagan explicitly justified a cut in government social spending by 
appealing to American’s preference for voluntary charity: 
The truth is that we’ve let Government take away many 
things we once considered were really ours to do volun-
tarily out of the goodness of our hearts and a sense of 
17 ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 595 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 
2012) (1835) (“The Americans make associations to give entertainments, to found semi-
naries, to build inns, to construct churches, to diffuse books, to send missionaries to the 
antipodes; in this manner they found hospitals, prisons, and schools. If it is proposed to 
inculcate some truth or to foster some feeling by the encouragement of a great example, 
they form a society . . . I have often admired the extreme skill with which the inhabitants 
of the United States succeed in proposing a common object for the exertions of a great 
many men and in inducing them voluntarily to pursue it.”). 
18 See Frequently Asked Questions, NATIONAL CENTER FOR CHARTIABLE STATISTICS, 
http://nccs.urban.org/FAQ/ (In 2012, more than 1.4 million exempt organizations had 
formally obtained recognition of their tax-exempt status from the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice.). 
19 See Stephen L. Carter, Ending Charity Tax Break Will Hurt Poor Most, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 
22, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-23/ending-charity-tax-break-would-hurt- 
poor-commentary-by-stephen-l-carter.html (“[T]he individual who gives to charity might 
measure the needs of the community by different calipers than centralized policy makers, 
and will therefore contribute to a different set of causes . . . These millions of individual 
decisions lead to a diversity in spending that would be impossible if we adopted the 
theory that the only money spent for the public good is the money spent by the state.”). 
20  See How Volunteering Became a Movement, POINTS OF LIGHT, 
http://www.pointsoflight.org/about-us (“Cast from the vision of 1,000 points of light 
shared by our founder President George H. W. Bush in his 1989 inaugural address, today 
Points of Light transcends politics and borders to inspire millions of volunteers world-
wide.”). 
21  About United We Serve, UNITED WE SERVE, http://www.serve.gov/?q=site-
page/about-united-we-serve (“This initiative aims to both expand the impact of existing 
organizations by engaging new volunteers in their work and encourage volunteers to 
develop their own ‘do-it-yourself’ projects.”). 
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community pride. I believe many of you want to do 
those things again . . . .22 
But, for the American poor, there is a problem: this myth is no match 
for reality. Popular confidence in the efficacy of charitable approaches is 
not supported by the evidence. Private nonprofit programs addressing 
economic and social needs suffer from insufficient resources, many em-
ploy non-professional approaches to providing services, and the sector’s 
work often reflects the wishes of wealthy donors rather than community 
needs. 23  Despite the country’s overall wealth, the United States has 
higher poverty rates24 and income inequality25 than comparable coun-
tries. Those numbers translate to widespread suffering, evidenced by 
millions lacking access to healthcare26 and safe, affordable housing.27 
The scattershot U.S. charitable efforts translate to a proliferation of soup 
kitchens and short-term homeless shelters, while sustainable nutrition 
assistance, healthcare, and housing support is scarce.28  
22 Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation on the Program for Economic Recovery 
(Sept. 24, 1981), http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/ 
1981/92481d.htm. 
23 See Lester Salamon, Of Market Failure, Voluntary Failure, and Third-Party Gov-
ernment: Toward a Theory of Government-Nonprofit Relations in the Modern Welfare 
State, 16 J. VOLUNTARY ACTION RES. 29 (1987) (outlining a four-part critique of phi-
lanthropic approaches on the basis of the sector’s insufficiency, paternalism, particular-
ism, and amateurism). 
24 Elise Gould & Hilary Wething, Economic Policy Institute, U.S. Poverty Rates 
Higher, Safety Net Weaker Than In Peer Countries 2–4 (July 24, 2012), 
http://www.epi.org/publication/ib339-us-poverty-higher-safety-net-weaker/. 
25 Oliver Denk et al., Organization For Economic Co-Operation And Development, 
Inequality And Poverty In The United States 13 (May 27, 2013), http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/economics/inequality-and-poverty-in-the-united-states_5k46957cwv8q-en. 
26  See Kaiser Family Foundation, Key Facts About The Uninsured Population, 
KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (Oct. 29, 2014), http://kff.org/uninsured/fact-sheet/key-
facts-about-the-uninsured-population/ (noting that 41 million Americans lacked health 
insurance in 2013, although the implementation of the Affordable Care Act caused the 
uninsured rate to drop for nonelderly individuals in the first quarter of 2014 by a full 
percentage point relative to the first quarter of the previous year.). Predictably, the poor 
in the U.S. also have significantly worse health outcomes than counterparts with higher 
incomes. See COMMONWEALTH FUND HEALTH CARE IN THE TWO AMERICAS: FINDINGS 
FROM THE SCORECARD ON STATE HEALTH SYSTEM PERFORMANCE FOR LOW-INCOME 
POPULATIONS (2013) (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/ 
publications/fund-reports/2013/sep/low-income-scorecard (“Lower-income populations 
are at increased risk of experiencing worse access, lower-quality care—particularly in 
outpatient settings—and worse health outcomes compared to those with higher incomes 
in their home state. Income-related disparities were most pronounced on measures of 
access, prevention, potentially unsafe prescription medication, and health outcomes.”). 
27  NATIONAL LOW-INCOME HOUSING COALITION, OUT OF REACH 4 (2014), 
http://nlihc.org/oor/2014 (noting unmet need for 7 million housing units for extremely 
low-income Americans). 
28 Id.; see also FOOD RESEARCH ACTION COUNCIL, FOOD HARDSHIP IN AMERICA 
2012 (Feb. 2013), http://frac.org/pdf/food_hardship_2012.pdf (noting that more than one 
in six Americans report inability to afford enough food.). 
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Many commentators have bemoaned the U.S. imbalance between 
charity and justice for the poor.29 But, like the proverbial complaints 
about the weather, the problem is identified far more often than solutions 
are posed. This article urges a two-part approach to remedying the chari-
ty/justice imbalance in the United States. First, the United States should 
eliminate the charitable tax deduction. It is a policy that does not effec-
tively address economic and social needs, it forces an inequitable pover-
ty relief and tax burden on the middle class, and it lulls the nation into a 
false sense of complacency about its poverty crisis. Second, the United 
States should replace the deduction, an artifact of the charity model, by 
ratifying the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. Ratification would be a step toward reversing the American lega-
cy of avoiding an enforceable commitment to economic and social jus-
tice. 
I.   CHARITY AS MORAL SAFETY VALVE 
The principle that charity is no substitute for justice substantially 
predates the 20th century human rights movement. People of faith can 
point to ancient religious traditions as the source for a mandate that all 
humans deserve justice, which includes enforceable rights to basic ne-
cessities. Old Testament prophets in particular spoke in terms of justice, 
with Micah and Amos trying to shake up the complacency of the pious, 
yet economically stratified 8th century B.C.E. Israel.30 In God’s name, 
they issued impassioned commands to, in Amos’ words, “let justice roll 
down like waters, and righteousness like an ever-flowing stream.” 31  
Isaiah’s mandate to “loose the bonds of wickedness”32 was the passage 
that Jesus chose to read to those gathered in the synagogue in the Gospel 
of Luke. 33 
The Quran speaks passionately of justice,34 and Confucian principles 
embrace a community-wide obligation to provide for the needs of all.35 
29 See Mike Konczal, The Voluntarism Fantasy, DEMOCRACY: A JOURNAL OF IDEAS 
(Spring, 2014), http://www.democracyjournal.org/32/the-voluntarism-
fantasy.php?page=all (“The last 30 years have seen effort after effort to try and push the 
policy agenda away from the state’s capabilities and toward private mechanisms for mi-
tigating the risks we face in the world. This effort is exhausted, and future endeavors will 
require a greater, not lesser, role for the public.”). 
30 J, KENNETH KURTZ, THE PEOPLE OF ANCIENT ISRAEL 257 (2009) (“[In the 9th cen-
tury B.C.][a]s one decade followed another, the contrasts between rich and poor became 
even more pronounced in Israel. In the ninth century, the social abuses and sharp eco-
nomic distinctions of an increasingly stratified society had been of little concern to the 
monarchy, and by the middle of the eight century such problems were met with complete 
indifference.”).  
31 Amos 5:24 (English Standard Version). 
32 Isaiah 58:6 (English Standard Version). 
33 Luke 4:16–18 (English Standard Version). 
34 Qur’an 16:90 (Saheeh International Version) (“Indeed, Allah orders justice and 
good conduct and giving to relatives and forbids immorality and bad conduct and op-
pression.”). 
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St. Augustine said that charity cannot make up for justice withheld.36 
Evangelical Christian and Sojourners magazine founder Jim Wallis is 
one of many faith leaders who explains the charity/justice conflict in 
terms of the parable of babies in the river.37 If a series of babies are 
found floating down the river, the community can respond by pulling 
each one out and caring for them. It would be a pure act of admirable 
charity, repeated over and over. But it is also incumbent on members of 
that community to go upstream to remedy the injustice that is causing 
those babies to be cast into the river in the first place.38 “All our reli-
gious and spiritual traditions focus on how we treat materially poor and 
excluded people, and suggest that the state of poor people is a moral test 
for the health of any society,” Wallis says. “And those traditions point us 
beyond mere charity as a response, but call us more prophetically to the 
deeper solutions of social and economic justice.”39  
Modern-day faith leaders have echoed similar messages. “Where are 
the saints to try to change the social order; not just to minister to the 
slaves but to do away with slavery?” asked 20th century Catholic activist 
Dorothy Day.40 A succession of Popes has insisted that Catholics pursue 
a just social order that makes charity less necessary.41 Even the conserv-
35  Joseph Chan, Making Sense of Confucian Justice, POLYLOG: FORUM FOR 
INTERCULTURAL PHILOSOPHY 3 (2001), http://them.polylog.org/3/fcj-en.htm (“A just 
society therefore has the following features: 1) Sufficiency for all – there is state provi-
sion to ensure that each citizen enjoys a level of material goods sufficient to live a good 
life. First priority would be given to the poor and needy.”). See also MARY ANN 
GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL 
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 185 (2002) (quoting Peng-chun Chang 1946 speech to 
Economic and Social Council in support of economic and social rights: “Provisions are 
made for the aged, employment is provided for the able-bodied and education is afforded 
to the young. Widows and widowers, orphans and the childless, the deformed and the 
diseased, all are cared for.”). 
36  Augustine of Hippo Quotes, THE EUROPEAN GRADUATE SCHOOL, 
http://www.egs.edu/library/augustine-of-hippo/quotes/.    
37 See Sarah Van Gelder, Meet the Refreshing Evangelical Who’s Leading a Reviv-
al—of “the Common Good,” YES MAGAZINE (May 30, 2013), 
http://www.yesmagazine.org/issues/love-and-the-apocalypse/jim-wallis-the-common-
good-in-a-violent-world.  
38 Id. (“Too many people are hauling drowning people out of the river—which is a 
good thing to do—but not sending somebody upstream to find out who or what’s throw-
ing them in. A lot of people are still trying to work with the symptoms and the victims—
which is wonderful and compassionate—but now we need to look at the causes.”). 
39  John Asling, Moving from Charity Towards Justice in Outreach Ministries, 
HAMILTON CONFERENCE http://www.hamconf.org/TW_Charity.pdf.  
40 Robert Ellsberg, Dorothy Day: Lecture on Centenary, THE CATHOLIC WORKER 
MOVEMENT (November 8, 1997), http://www.catholicworker.org/dorothyday/ 
canonizationtext.cfm?Number=33.  
41  See, e.g., POPE LEO XIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER RERUM NOVARUM (1891) (Pope 
Leo XIII cites the teachings of Thomas Aquinas, saying that capitalism’s rough edges 
have to be smoothed out by the state guaranteeing workers a living wage: “[There is] a 
dictate of natural justice more imperious and ancient than any bargain between man and 
man, namely, that wages ought not to be insufficient to support a frugal and well-
behaved wage-earner.”); POPE PIUS XI, PIUS XI, ENCYCLICAL 
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ative Pope Benedict XVI said in 2005, “Instead of contributing through 
individual works of charity to maintaining the status quo, we need to 
build a just social order in which all receive their share of the world’s 
goods and no longer have to depend on charity.”42 The Rev. William 
Sloane Coffin explained the need for enforceable rights: “Human nature 
is sinful, and therefore the virtue of the few will never compensate for 
the inertia of the many,” wrote the minister, peace activist, and chaplain 
at Yale University. “Given human goodness, voluntary contributions are 
possible, but given human sinfulness, legislation is indispensable. Chari-
ty, yes always; but never as a substitute for justice.”43  
Generations of philosophers have made the same argument from a 
secular perspective. Immanuel Kant wrote, “In giving to an unfortunate 
man, we do not give him a gratuity but only help to return to him that of 
which the general injustice of our system has deprived him.”44 Brazilian 
educator Paolo Friere said that true generosity is expressed by fighting to 
destroy the need for charity.45  Noted 21st century ethicist Allen Bucha-
nan outlines a continuum running from charity to justice, with moral 
progress occurring when the realm of justice expands into what was pre-
viously considered to be the domain of charity.46 Writers and political 
leaders have delivered similar pronouncements. Samuel Johnson found 
the world to be kinder than he expected but less just 47  and Mary 
LETTER QUADRAGESIMO ANNO (1931) (Pius XI Depression-era encyclical expanding on 
the church’s embrace of workers’ rights to organize into unions, earn a living wage, and 
receive state assistance when necessary); Zachary A. Goldfarb and Michelle Boors-
tein, Pope Francis Denounces ‘Trickle-Down’ Economic Theories in Critique of Inequa-
lity, WASH. POST, (Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
business/economy/pope-francis-denounces-trickle-down-economic-theories-in-critique-
of-inequality/2013/11/26/e17ffe4e-56b6-11e3-8304-caf30787c0a9_story.html (Pope 
Francis, the former Jorge Bergoglio has labeled unfettered capitalism “a new tyranny,” 
condemned the “idolatry of money,” and denounced structural inequality that sentences 
so many millions of the world’s citizens to abject poverty.). 
42  POPE BENEDICT XVI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER CARITAS DEUS CARITAS EST IN 
VERITATE (2005). 
43 William Sloane Coffin, The Collected Sermons Of William Sloane Coffin: The 
Riverside Years, Volume 2 at 91 (2008). 
44 IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 194 (Louis Infield trans., 1980). See also, 
IMMANUEL KANT, THE DOCTRINE OF VIRTUE IN THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 116 (M.J. 
Gregor trans., 1964) (“The ability to practice beneficence, which depends on property, 
follows largely from the injustice of government, which favours certain men and so in-
troduces an inequality of wealth that makes others need help. This being the case, does 
the rich man’s help to the needy, on which he so readily prides himself as something 
meritorious, really deserve to be called beneficence at all?”). 
45 PAOLO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 28–29 (Myra B. Ramo trans., 1970).  
47 Allen Buchanan, Justice and Charity, 97 ETHICS 558, 558 (1987). See also 
RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 266 (2002) (“We may try to live with only the 
resources we think we would have in a fair society, doing the best we can, with the sur-
plus, to repair injustice through private charity. But since a just distribution [can only be 
established] through just institutions, we are unable to judge what share of our wealth is 
fair.”). 
47 JAMES BOSWELL, LIFE OF JOHNSON 217 (2004). 
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Wollstonecraft (“It is justice, not charity, that is wanting in the 
world!”)48 bemoaned the elevation of charity over justice, as did Nelson 
Mandela (“And overcoming poverty is not a gesture of charity. It is an 
act of justice.”).49 
Sociologist Janet Poppendieck gave the charity-justice conflict a 
book-length treatment in 1998’s Sweet Charity?, her study of the U.S. 
system of food pantries and soup kitchens that sprung up as replace-
ments for scaled-back anti-poverty entitlement programs.50 While prais-
ing the many dedicated providers she encountered in her research, Pop-
pendieck concluded that society pays a substantial cost for their kindness. 
The most obvious cost is assessed at the point of contact, when reci-
pients of charity often feel demeaned, even in settings where donors try 
to minimize the unavoidable hierarchy of benevolence.51 Catholic nun 
Sister Peggy Flanagan, a volunteer at a Salvation Army hot meal pro-
gram, said, paraphrasing St. Vincent de Paul, “When you feed the poor, 
please ask for their forgiveness. You are giving them a bowl of soup, but 
they give up their dignity.”52 As any mother forced to line up for help 
from the community food pantry can tell you, it truly is better to give 
than to receive.  
Poppendieck identifies far broader damage flowing from the U.S. 
culture’s preference for charity over rights. When a large majority of 
Americans report that they donate or volunteer for charity, it is not just a 
symptom of a society where the poor are forced to scramble for donated 
goods. It is a cause of that suffering as well. “The growth of kindness 
and the decline in justice are intimately interrelated,” Poppendieck writes. 
“This massive charitable endeavor serves to relieve pressure for more 
fundamental solutions.” 53 
Poppendieck extends the metaphor to argue that broad participation 
in—and awareness of—charitable efforts act as a “moral safety valve.”54 
Participating in a walk-a-thon for the homeless or donating a box of ma-
caroni and cheese to the community food drive allows many Americans 
to avoid confronting the immorality of a society where great wealth ex-
48 MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMAN 40 (1792). 
49  In Full: Mandela’s Poverty Speech, BBC NEWS (Feb. 3, 2005), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4232603.stm. 
50  JANET POPPENDIECK, SWEET CHARITY?: EMERGENCY FOOD AND THE END OF 
ENTITLEMENT (1998). 
51 Id. at 228–29, 232, 249. See also REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL 
SOCIETY 127 (1932) (“[P]hilanthropy combines genuine pity with the display of power 
and that the latter element explains why the powerful are more inclined to be generous 
than to grant social justice.”). 
52 NIAGARA MOTHERS’ UNION ET AL., WORKING TOGETHER FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, 
CHARITY AND ADVOCACY: A GUIDE FOR DISCUSSION AND REFLECTION 4, 
http://voicesforchange.ca/uploaded/charity-to-justice-workshop-guide-2012.pdf. 
53 POPPENDIECK, supra note 51, at 5. 
54 Id. 
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ists alongside grinding poverty.55 Charity may not be very effective at 
alleviating long-term poverty, but it is quite good at alleviating American 
guilt about it. 
Poppendieck characterizes most charitable efforts as unintentionally 
distracting rather than intentionally masking the problems of inequali-
ty.56 But other commentators point out that most comparatively wealthy 
charitable donors would not be displeased to know that donations from 
their excess help to perpetuate an unequal system that has richly re-
warded them.57 
There is also the undeniable reality that, for many concerned and 
compassionate Americans, it is simply preferable to be engaged in 
hands-on service as opposed to traveling the long, circuitous, and often 
frustrating path of activism for justice. As a physician who founded a 
Washington, D.C. community for homeless men with HIV/AIDS writes, 
“For most of us, the work of advocacy is less rewarding than day-today 
contact with needy people. It is less direct. As an advocate, I may never 
see significant change; I would rather immerse myself in direct service. 
And so the desperately needed work of advocacy is left undone.”58 
For heroes like these who devote their lives to charitable works, their 
exposure to unmet need deprives them of the luxury of avoidance. In her 
research, Poppendieck interviewed scores of operators and volunteers at 
emergency food programs, most of whom were quite aware of the limita-
tions of the charity model in which they were immersed.59 Many anti-
hunger leaders told Poppendieck that they feel trapped by the need to 
55 Id. at 198–99. See also C.S. LEWIS, YOURS, JACK: SPIRITUAL GUIDANCE FROM C.S. 
LEWIS 119 (2008) (Lewis is among those who have given voice to the notion that private 
charity can excuse a citizen from concerns over suffering they do not witness first-hand: 
“I think each village was meant to feel pity for its own sick and poor whom it can help 
and I doubt if it is the duty of any private person to fix his mind on ills which he cannot 
help. This may even become an escape from the works of charity we really can do to 
those we know.  
56 POPPENDIECK, supra note 51, at 301–02. 
57 Satyajit Das, Philanthropy Is Not Just Charity from the Rich: It’s Self-Serving, 
Independent, (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/ 
news/business/comment/philanthropy-is-not-just-charity-from-the-rich-its-selfserving-
9927181.html(“[Philanthropy by the wealthy] is an exercise in damage control against 
any backlash by the less well-off. Its perspectives are self-serving, promoting views 
beneficial to the business and financial interests of the wealthy. . . .The paradox of phi-
lanthropy is that enrichment by various [harmful] means paves the way for conspicuous 
generosity.”); David Hilfiker, Justice and the Limits of Charity, DavidHilfiker.com 
(Sept.–Oct., 2000), http://www.davidhilfiker.com/index.php?option=com_ 
content&view=article&id=13:limits-of-charity&catid=8:justice-essays&Itemid=17 
(“Charity does little to change the wider social and political systems that sustain injus-
tice. In fact, most charities depend heavily on the very volunteers, individual donors, and 
institutions that have prospered under the current systems. And people who have done 
well in a system are usually not interested in changing it drastically—in fact, they may be 
diametrically opposed.”). 
58 Hilfiker, supra note 58. 
59 POPPENDIECK, supra note 51, at 289. 
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address the direct suffering caused by a shredded safety net, and to pro-
mote the value of their own programs to donors.60 One rabbi who helped 
found a New York City soup kitchen told Poppendieck that she discou-
rages people who seek to follow her path, urging them instead to look for 
opportunities to be an advocate for systemic change.61  But those who, 
like the rabbi, tackle the significant challenge of direct charity work of-
ten do not have the time to serve as advocates for justice. Consumed 
with the task of pulling the babies out of the river, they have no spare 
energy for a venture upstream for advocacy. It is a dilemma Poppendieck 
cites as one of the opportunity costs of the U.S. charitable model.62 
 II.   ELIMINATE THE U.S. CHARITABLE TAX DEDUCTION 
A.   An Inequitable Reward for the Wealthy 
The United States’ uniquely high level of reliance on a charitable re-
sponse to poverty is not just an artifact of culture or history. It is an ap-
proach formally sanctioned by government policy expressed in its most 
tangible manifestation: the tax code.63 Since 1917, U.S. law has allowed 
individuals, corporations, and estates to deduct as much as half of their 
annual taxable income in an amount equal to charitable gifts made to 
qualified nonprofit organizations.64 The “501(c)(3)” organizations that 
are eligible to receive tax-deductible gifts include charitable, religious, 
educational, and sports groups, among others.65 This U.S. tax deduction 
provides the most generous incentive for charitable giving of any devel-
oped nation.66 As economist Joseph Schumpeter said over a half-century 
ago, “Nothing shows so clearly the character of a society and of a civili-
zation as does the fiscal policy that its political sector adopts.”67 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 299–303. 
63 See, e.g., Susan Pace Hamill, An Evaluation of Federal Tax Policy Based on Ju-
deo-Christian Ethics, 25 VA. TAX REV. 671, 752 (2006) (“Given that nearly eighty per-
cent of Americans claim to adhere to Christianity or Judaism in some form, why is our 
tax policy at both the national and state levels continuing to move further away from 
reflecting genuine Judeo-Christian values?”). 
64 See 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(A). The deduction for charitable contributions has ex-
isted since 1917; see War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 330 (1917). 
65 26 U.S.C. § 170(c). 
66 Rob Reich, A Failure of Philanthropy: American Charity Shortchanges the Poor, 
and Public Policy is Partly to Blame, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. (Winter, 2005), 
http://www.ssireview.org/articles/entry/a_failure_of_philanthropy. 
67 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 769 (1954). See also 
LIAM MURPHY AND THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 188 
(2002) (“Nothing could be more mundane than taxes, but they provide a perfect setting 
for constant moral argument and possible moral progress.”). 
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The most obvious effect of this policy is a loss of tax revenue.68  For 
a U.S. taxpayer at the highest marginal rate of 39.6%, every dollar in 
charitable contributions reduces their tax obligation by nearly 40 cents.69 
The estimated annual cost of charitable tax deductions is $40 billion in 
lost revenue, 70  an amount more than three times the annual federal 
budget for the program Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
(“TANF”).71 The deduction thus acts to transfer money—and power—
away from democratically elected government and hand them to indi-
vidual donors.  
The resulting nonprofit sector funded by these tax-deductible gifts 
has been called “the hidden welfare state.”72  But it is the kind of welfare 
state that government-mistrusting Americans can live with, Yale law pro-
fessor Stephen Carter has written. “The [charitable] deduction is democ-
racy in action,” Carter says.73 
Except that it isn’t. The nonprofit sector is radically elitist in that it 
places decision-making power firmly in the hands of our country’s most 
wealthy residents.74  By definition, the rich possess the most disposable 
income and can afford to donate more than others of lesser means.75 
That disproportionate control over the nonprofit sector, sometimes re-
ferred to as a “plutocratic bias,” is further buttressed by two characteris-
tics of the charitable tax deduction.76  First, the majority of lower and 
middle-income Americans file their taxes without itemizing their deduc-
68  JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON TAX 
EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS AND HISTORICAL SURVEY OF TAX EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES, 
(2011),https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=3740 (2010–2014 
estimated revenue cost of charitable tax deduction is $182.4 billion); REICH, supra note 
67 (noting that the charitable contributions deduction is the fourth largest (out of 130) tax 
expenditure given to individuals, after deductions for mortgage interest, contributions to 
401(k) plans, and state and local taxes). 
69 See 26 U.S.C. § 1(a)–(d) (2014). 
70  CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR TAX 
EXPENDITURES IN THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX SYSTEM 17 (2013), 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/43768_DistributionTaxExpenditures.pdf.   
71 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN 
AND FAMILIES, TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES, FY 2012 BUDGET (2012), 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/olab/tanf.pdf. 
72  See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE: TAX 
EXPENDITURES AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1999). 
73 Carter, supra note 20.  
74 See, e.g., FRANCIE OSTROWER, WHY THE WEALTHY GIVE: THE CULTURE OF ELITE 
PHILANTHROPY 29 (1995) (“Elite philanthropy involves far more than monetary contribu-
tions. . . . [G]iving does not occur in isolation, but is part of an overall involvement with 
nonprofit organizations.”); Opinion, Ray Madoff, A Better Way to Encourage Charity, 
N.Y. TIMES, October 5, 2014 (describing how many wealthy donors put their tax-exempt 
money into private foundations or donor-advised funds so they can maintain significant 
control even after they benefit from their deduction). 
75 Some commentators say that donations by the wealthy are, at their core, self-
serving. See Das, supra note 58.  
76 Rob Reich, Toward a Political Theory of Philanthropy, in GIVING WELL: THE 
ETHICS OF PHILANTHROPY 177, 184 (Patricia Illingworth et al. eds., 2011). 
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tions.77 They get no tax benefit from their charity.  Second, even the mi-
nority of modest-income donors who do claim charitable tax deductions 
benefit less from their gifts than do more wealthy donors since wealthy 
donors’ tax rates are higher.78 
The result is a skewed reward system. Three-quarters of the tax 
money saved via charitable deductions goes to donors with annual in-
comes over $500,000, even though these people’s donations total just a 
little more than half of all charitable gifts.79 U.S. taxpayers with incomes 
under $50,000 gave 20% of all charitable donations, but benefitted from 
only 5% of the total deduction subsidy.80  
The fundamentally inequitable nature of the charitable tax subsidy is 
illustrated by Charles Clotfelter, a Duke University economist who has 
written extensively on U.S. tax policy. Noting that Americans of more 
modest means tend to donate most to religious organizations, Clotfelter 
points to a hypothetical fundraising effort to put a new steeple on a Me-
thodist church in Kansas.81 The $50,000 raised for the steeple comes 
from smaller individual donations by parishioners who, like most Amer-
icans, do not itemize their tax deductions.82 No government revenue was 
lost by this effort. But the wealthiest Americans favor higher education 
with their gifts, and they are sure to itemize their deductions.83 So, Clot-
felter notes, a comparable $50,000 donation to the Stanford University 
athletics department by a high-income donor would have a very different 
effect.84 The gift would be de facto subsidized by other U.S. taxpayers in 
77 Andrew Lundeen & Scott A. Hodge, Higher Income Taxpayers Are Most Likely 
to Claim Itemized Deductions, TAX FOUNDATION (November 07, 2013), 
http://taxfoundation.org/blog/higher-income-taxpayers-are-most-likely-claim-itemized-
deductions. 
78 See Richard H. Thaler, It’s Time to Rethink the Charity Deduction, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 18, 2010 (“The government subsidizes charitable gifts from certain households . . . . 
To qualify, taxpayers must have a substantial home mortgage; the subsidy rate increases 
with taxable income. Low-income taxpayers receive no subsidy, but donations from 
qualified high-income taxpayers are subsidized by as much as 40 percent — or more.”) 
Thaler proposes changing the deduction to a tax credit, making the subsidy even for all 
donors, and allowing the tax credit only for donations over a minimum percentage of 
gross income. 
79 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 71, at 15.  
80 Sweetened Charity, THE ECONOMIST (June 9, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21556570. 
81 Charles T. Clotfelter, Charitable Giving and Tax Policy in the U.S. 5–6, 10 (May 
7, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Paris School of Economics), 
http://www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/IMG/pdf/may2012-paris-clotfelter.pdf. 
82 Id. at 10.  
83 See, e.g., Donations to U.S. Colleges and Universities Increased 8.2 Percent In 
2011, Nat’l. Ass’n C. & U. Bus. Officers, (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.nacubo.org/ 
Research/Research_News/Donations_to_US_Colleges_and_Universities_ 
Increased_82_in_2011.html.  
84 Clotfelter, supra note 82, at 10–11. 
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the amount of $17,500, the tax that a wealthy donor in the 35% bracket 
avoided paying by making the gift.85 
The nonprofit sector is not just profoundly un-democratic, it also 
fails to produce anything resembling a “hidden welfare state”—at least a 
welfare state that would benefit those most in need. The legal parameters 
for organizations eligible for the 501(c)(3) designation are quite broad, 
meaning that tax-deductible gifts can go to support college football 
teams, opera companies, and rare bird sanctuaries just as easily as they 
can be directed toward domestic violence shelters.86 Historically, high-
income donors have shown a preference for gifts to higher education, 
health, and the arts.87  The majority of donations given by Americans are 
to religious organizations, which direct only about 5% of those gifts to 
social services.88  
Despite the charitable tax deduction defenders’ insistence that “the 
social good of the deduction far outweighs the money it costs,”89 it turns 
out that a quite limited amount of U.S. donations have the effect of trans-
ferring resources from rich Americans to poorer ones. 90 Some tax-
85 Id. 
86 See, e.g., Kent Faulk, Nick Saban Sold Home to Crimson Tide Foundation for 
$3.1 Million in 2013, AOL News, (Oct. 26, 2014), 
http://www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/2014/10/crimson_tide_foundation_bough
t.html (Alabama not-for-profit corporation directs funds to provide housing to the univer-
sity’s football coach, whose salary is estimated at $7 million per year.). 
87 See Doug Donovan, Ben Gose & Maria Di Mento, Gifts Surge From Rich U.S. 
Donors, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY., (Feb. 9, 2014), 
http://philanthropy.com/article/Gifts-Surge-From-Rich-U-S/144601/ (Colleges, founda-
tions, and hospitals received the most gifts worth $1-million or more in 2013, followed 
by medical research facilities, arts organizations, and human-service groups.); see also 
Kaitlin Mulhere, Deep-Pocket Donors, INSIDE HIGHER ED, Jan. 28, 2015, 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/01/28/2014-record-year-higher-ed-donations 
(Charitable donations to colleges reached an all-time high of nearly $38 billion in 2014, 
with 28.6 percent of the total given to fewer than 2 percent of the roughly 1,000 institu-
tions that participated in the Council for Aid to Education’s survey.). 
88 ROBERT WUTHNOW, SAVING AMERICA? FAITH-BASED SOCIAL SERVICES AND THE 
FUTURE OF CIVIL SOCIETY 49 (2004). See also Joseph J. Cordes, Re-Thinking the Deduc-
tion for Charitable Contributions: Evaluating the Effects of Deficit-Reduction Proposals, 
64 NAT’L TAX J. 1019, 1024 (2011) (Religious nonprofits claim the largest share of U.S. 
contributions, at 33.3% of the overall contributions.). 
89 Three-Fourths of Americans Favor Charitable Tax Deduction: Survey Indicates 
Any Changes to System Would Face Strong Opposition, DUNHAM & COMPANY, (Feb. 7, 
2012), http://dunhamandcompany.com/2012/02/three-fourths-of-americans-favor-
charitable-tax-deduction/. 
90  INDIANA UNIVERSITY CENTER ON PHILANTHROPY, PATTERNS OF HOUSEHOLD 
CHARITABLE GIVING BY INCOME GROUP, 2005 (2007), 
http://www.philanthropy.iupui.edu/files/research/giving_focused_on_meeting_needs_of_
the_poor_july_2007.pdf (less than one-third of the money individuals gave to nonprofits 
in 2005 was focused on the needs of the economically disadvantaged.). See also Reich, A 
Failure of Philanthropy, supra note 67 (“[W]e should then stop kidding ourselves that 
charity and philanthropy do much to help the poor.”). 
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deductible donations, such as those to foundations that support already-
wealthy school districts, actually act to increase inequality.91  
Most Americans do not know this. The charitable model is singularly 
well-marketed in the United States, as warm public service announce-
ments and glossy annual reports trumpet how well nonprofits meet the 
community’s needs.92 These efforts have succeeded, with a clear majori-
ty of Americans reporting a belief that nonprofits are better at promoting 
social welfare than government programs.93 And rising levels of eco-
nomic segregation mean that non-poor Americans are rarely confronted 
by the realities of poverty.94 American Enterprise Institute president Ar-
thur Brooks, writing earlier this year in the magazine Commentary, di-
rectly addressed conservative Americans in an effort to puncture any 
illusions of charity’s impact.95 “It would be wonderful if America could 
solve all its problems of poverty and need through private charity,” he 
wrote. “But even in this remarkably charitable country…private dona-
tions cannot guarantee anywhere near the level of assistance that vast 
majorities of Americans across the political spectrum believe is our mor-
al duty.” 96   
The absence of a meaningful anti-poverty impact from donated dol-
lars is particularly discouraging when compared to the opportunity lost 
due to tax revenue that could have been spent on proven government 
assistance programs like food stamps, unemployment compensation and 
housing assistance.97 Even in their underfunded condition here in the 
United States, such programs are more efficient than comparable charity 
efforts, and are credited with lifting more than 40 million people out of 
poverty each year.98 
91 See Rob Reich, Opinion, Not Very Giving, N.Y. TIMES, (September 4, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/05/opinion/not-very-giving.html?_r=1&.  
92 See Peter Panepento, How Much Should Nonprofit Groups Spend on Marketing?, 
CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY (Nov. 18, 2009), 
http://philanthropy.com/blogs/giveandtake/how-much-should-nonprofit-groups-spend-
on-marketing/10370 (quoting nonprofit advisor suggestion that organizations spend 10-
20% of their budget on marketing). 
93 DUNHAM & CO., supra note 90. 
94 See Patrick Sharkey, Rich Neighborhood, Poor Neighborhood: How Segregation 
Threatens Social Mobility, BROOKINGS (Dec. 5, 2013, 12:30 PM), 
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/social-mobility-memos/posts/2013/12/04-how-
segregation-threatens-mobility.  
95 Arthur C. Brooks, ‘Be Open-Handed Toward Your Brother’, Commentary (Feb. 1, 
2014), http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/be-open-handed-toward-your- 
brothers-1/. 
96 Id. 
97 See Konczal, supra note 30 (“Patchy and spotty as it is, today’s [U.S.] welfare 
state backstopped the economy during the Great Recession, and is still capable of provid-
ing broad security for the American people.”).  
98 See Robert Greenstein, Commentary: How Effective Is the Safety Net?, CTR. ON 
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Feb. 6, 2013), 
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=3898#_ftn2 (finding that government 
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B.   Exposing the Charity Illusion 
In support of a local effort to raise the minimum wage, I sometimes 
give talks to service organizations and community groups.99 As part of 
the presentation, I outline the daily challenges faced by the low-income 
workers we serve in our law school clinic.100 For example, I often talk 
about a local hotel housekeeper who gets down on her hands and knees 
each day to scrub other people’s toilets, but cannot afford health insur-
ance for herself.101 She earns so little that it can be a struggle to keep 
food on the family table. The hotel worker is perpetually on the verge of 
eviction and homelessness, and she has her already meager paycheck 
garnished to pay off healthcare and housing debts.102 
After these talks, I can count on at least one person to approach me 
with a particular question. He sees no need to raise her wages. In fact, he 
is puzzled by the housekeeper’s struggles. “Why,” he asks, “can’t she 
just go to a food pantry?” By this time, others have usually gathered 
around the questioner, and they nod their heads. They have been wonder-
ing the same thing. 
This enduring American delusion owes its existence in part to the 
U.S. charitable tax deduction. The deduction is an elitist, ineffective pol-
icy creation that harms the poor and forces an inequitable burden on the 
middle class. Worse, the deduction lulls the nation into a false sense of 
complacency about our poverty crisis.103 It is time to eliminate it. 
I am not the first to suggest this. In 2012 budget debates, when Pres-
ident Obama proposed a cap on charitable deductions, others took the 
safety net programs lift one of every seven Americans out of poverty, an amount exceed-
ing forty million people); Joanne W. Hsu, David A. Matsa & Brian T. Melzer, Positive 
Externalities of Social Insurance: Unemployment Insurance and Consumer Credit 4 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 20353, 2014), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w20353 (estimating that expansions of unemployment insur-
ance from 2008 to 2012 prevented 1.4 million foreclosures); Diane Archer, Medicare is 
More Efficient Than Private Insurance, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Sept. 20, 2011), 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2011/09/20/medicare-is-more-efficient-than-private-
insurance/ (finding that administrative costs in Medicare are only about two percent of 
operating expenditures, compared to an estimated seventeen percent of revenue for pri-
vate health insurance).   
99 My presentations are usually conducted on behalf of the organization Raise the 
Wage Indiana. See RAISE THE WAGE INDIANA, www.raisethewagein.org.  
100  Clinical Courses, IND. U. ROBERT H. MCKINNEY SCH. OF L. (2015), 
http://mckinneylaw.iu.edu/courses/clinics.cfm. 
101 See FRAN QUIGLEY, IF WE CAN WIN HERE: THE NEW FRONT LINES OF THE LABOR 
MOVEMENT 1–9 (2015) (describing narrative of the Indianapolis hotel housekeeper, Kei-
sha Johnson).  
102 Id. 
103 See, e.g., Poppendieck, supra note 51, at 5, 26–27; see also Warren Goldstein, 
William Sloane Coffin Jr.: A Holy Impatience 142 (2008) (quoting the question posed to 
Solon, the law-giver of Athens: “When will perfect justice come to Athens?” And the 
answer: “When those who are not the victims of injustice feel just as keenly as those who 
are.”). 
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opportunity to push further.104 Citing the unequal benefits the deduction 
provides to wealthy donors, Cato Institute senior fellow Daniel Mitchell 
wrote a Wall Street Journal column arguing that high-income Americans 
can forego the deduction, especially since they already benefit from the 
premium symphony seats or named university buildings that reward their 
generosity. 105 The Economist made a similar point in an article that 
quoted William Gladstone’s 1863 speech to the House of Commons.106 
The working class should not be subject to greater tax obligations to 
compensate for a wealthy citizen’s charitable donation that already 
brought the donor “credit and notoriety,” Gladstone argued.107 
Eliminating the charitable tax deduction would lead to billions in in-
creased tax revenue each year.108 For example, that revenue could be 
directed to pre-school education for poor children instead of a college 
stadium suite with a donor’s name on a plaque over the door.109 Even 
more importantly, eliminating the charitable deduction would allow for a 
long overdue reckoning with our country’s crisis of inequality. 110  It 
would destroy the illusion that discretionary charity diverted from the 
excess accumulated by our nation’s wealthy constitutes either an ethical 
or effective societal response to hunger, homelessness, and illness. The 
moral safety valve provided by tax-deductible charity should be shut 
off.111  
An illustration of the charity illusion was provided in the 2012 dis-
cussion of lowering the charitable tax deduction—it survived that year’s 
budget debate intact—when a lobbyist for the nonprofit sector defended 
the deduction in a newspaper column.112 As an illustration of the deduc-
104 See Jonathan Weisman, Democrats Like a Romney Idea on Income Tax, N.Y. 
TIMES (November 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/13/us/politics/ 
democrats-like-a-romney-idea-to-cap-tax-deductions.html?pagewanted=all. 
105 Daniel J. Mitchell, Should We End the Tax Deduction for Charitable Donations? 
Yes: It Doesn't Increase Giving, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 16, 2012), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324469304578143351470610998 
106 Sweetened Charity, supra note 81. 
107 Id. 
108 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 71, at 17. 
109 Compare Adrienne Lu, Head Start Hit With Worst Cuts in its History, USA 
TODAY (Aug. 20, 2013, 10:24 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/ 
2013/08/19/stateline-head-start/2671309/, with Phil Rishe, Thank You, Phil Knight: Ore-
gon's New $68 Million Recruiting Tool, FORBES (Aug. 3, 2013, 7:13 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/prishe/2013/08/03/thank-you-phil-knight-oregons-new-68-
million-recruiting-tool/ (Nike CEO Phil Knight and wife have donated over $300 million 
to the University of Oregon and its athletic department over the past 20 years). 
110  D r e w D e S i l v e r ,  U.S. Income Inequality, On Rise for Decades, is Now 
Highest Since 1928, Pew Res. Ctr. ( D e c .  5 ,  2 0 1 3 ) ,  
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/12/05/u-s-income-inequality-on-rise-for-
decades-is-now-highest-since-1928/. 
111 See generally POPPENDIECK, supra note 51 at 99.  
112 Diana Aviv, Should We End the Tax Deduction for Charitable Donations? No: 
Nonprofits Are in Dire Need of Funds, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 16, 2012, 4:08 
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tion’s utility, she cited the Congressional extension of allowable deduc-
tions for donations made in response to Haiti’s devastating earthquake of 
January, 2010.113 Indeed, that U.S. tax law did achieve a narrow goal: 
nearly half of all U.S. households donated to Haitian relief efforts.114 
But, as I, and others, have written elsewhere, those generously-funded 
Haitian relief and recovery efforts were disastrously implemented.115 
The characteristic flaws of a charitable response to social crises—a lack 
of coordination among hundreds of isolated nonprofit efforts, the eleva-
tion of donor interests and non-profit visibility over the needs of those to 
be served—are on full, painful display in still-struggling Port-au-Prince 
today.116 Yet, it is likely that most 2010 U.S. donors to Haitian relief feel 
that, due in part to their generosity, Haitians’ needs were effectively ad-
dressed.117 The poor continue to suffer; the donors have moved on. This 
is the inherent dynamic of the charitable model. 
None of this is to say that the U.S. nonprofit sector does not have 
value. Acts of discretionary compassion can, and should supplement a 
broad system that guarantees each individual her right to the essentials of 
life.118 Small-scale charitable programs can provide valuable examples 
of innovation, developing methods that improve the comprehensive sys-
tems that address social needs.119 Similar benefits from private efforts 
can be found on an individual level. Volunteerism and donations can 
provide the first-hand exposure to inequality and suffering that moves a 
charity-focused individual to become an advocate for justice.  Persons 
PM),http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732446930457814335147061
0998 
113 Id. 
114 See Haiti Dominates Public’s Consciousness: Nearly Half Have Donated or 
Plan to Give, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 20, 2010), http://www.people-
press.org/2010/01/20/haiti-dominates-publics-consciousness/.  
115 See Mark Schuller, Killing With Kindness: Haiti, International Aid, And NGOs 5 
(2012); Justin Elliott & Laura Sullivan, How the Red Cross Raised Half-a-Billion Dol-
lars for Haiti and Built Six Homes, Pro Publica (June 3, 2105), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/how-the-red-cross-raised-half-a-billion-dollars-for-
haiti-and-built-6-homes; Fran Quigley, How Human Rights Can Build Haiti 84–110 
(2014).  
116 See e.g., Fran Quigley, Things Are Difficult: A Post-Earthquake Disaster in Haiti, 
COMMON DREAMS (April 12, 2013), http://www.commondreams.org/ 
views/2013/04/12/things-are-difficult-post-earthquake-disaster-haiti.  
117 See Three-Fourths of Americans Favor Charitable Tax Deduction, supra note 89. 
118 See Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Non-Profit Sector in 
a Three-Sector Economy, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY, AND ECONOMIC THEORY 171 (1975) 
(Not-for-profit sector complements private and government sectors by providing services 
when majoritarian government sector does not reflect wishes of minority of people). 
119  See e.g., NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF & SHERYL WUDUNN, A PATH APPEARS: 
TRANSFORMING LIVES, CREATING OPPORTUNITIES 311 (2014) (making the case for private 
charity, but noting that large-scale improvements like a sanitation system or early child-
hood education program can only be accomplished by governments). 
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stocking food pantry shelves join anti-hunger lobby groups. 120  Bill 
Gates’ experience making historically large charitable donations led him 
to embrace the role of champion for government-funded health programs 
and tax equity.121  
So it is heartening to realize that eliminating the charitable tax de-
duction would not doom the U.S. nonprofit sector. Evidence over time 
shows that donations appear to be tied more to a rise in wealth rather 
than the tax treatment of gifts.122 The giving from modest-income do-
nors who do not itemize currently ill be unaffected by eliminating the 
deduction they do not benefit from.123 As for the wealthy, there is a vi-
gorous debate about the importance of the charitable deduction on deci-
sions to donate.124  But the most persuasive evidence questions the im-
portance of charitable tax deduction in spurring decisions to give.125 It 
120 See e.g., Latest Reflection from FUPC – Bread for the World Volunteer Libby 
McDermott, First United Presbyterian Church Of Cambridge, http://www.fupc-
cambridge.org/news/201312/latest-reflection-fupc-bread-world-volunteer-libby-
mcdermott (Volunteer both at food pantries and for advocacy group Bread for World 
writes, “[I work with] direct food assistance programs (soup kitchens, food pantries, etc.) 
and [on] the political and social reality that makes these programs necessary. To end 
hunger we take care of our neighbors and make sure they have enough food on a daily 
basis, but we must also tackle the tough questions about why our neighbors are poor in 
the first place and do what we can to change a broken and unfair system.”). 
121 See Bill Gates, 2014 Gates Annual Letter: Three Myths That Block Progress For 
The Poor, Gates Foundation (2014), http://www.gatesfoundation.org/ 
Who-We-Are/Resources-and-Media/Annual-Letters-List/Annual-Letter-2014 (“It is 
ironic that the foundation has a reputation for a hard-nosed focus on results, and yet 
many people are cynical about the government aid programs we partner with.”); Tanya 
Somanader, Billionaire Bill Gates Calls For Increasing Taxes On The Rich: ‘That’s Just 
Justice’, Think Progress, (Jan. 25, 2012), 
http://Thinkprogress.Org/Economy/2012/01/25/411283/Bill-Gates-Taxes-Justice/. 
122  See U.S. Charitable Giving Estimated To Be $307.65 Billion in 2008, 
FUNDRAISING SUCCESS (June 10, 2009), 
http://www.fundraisingsuccessmag.com/article/2008-us-charitable-giving-estimated-
30765-billion-408218/1 (2008 recession triggered only the second reduction in charitable 
giving in over a half-century, yet giving continued to reflect just over two percent of 
GDP); Joanne G. Carman & Richard M. Clerkin, Snap Poll: Increases in Tax Rates Will 
Not Greatly Affect Charitable Giving, PHILANTHROPY J. (Apr. 15, 2013), 
http://pj.news.chass.ncsu.edu/?p=32700 (poll results consistent with 100 years of charit-
able giving data showing that Americans give roughly two percent GDP annually regard-
less of increases or decreases in tax rates). 
123 Clotfelter, supra note 81. 
124 See, e.g., Gerald E. Auten et al., Taxes and Philanthropy Among the Wealthy, in 
DOES ATLAS SHRUG? THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH 392, 392 
(Joel B. Slemrod ed., 2000); Patrick E. Tolan, Jr., Compromising the Safety Net: How 
Limiting Tax Deductions for High-Income Donors Could Undermine Charitable Organi-
zations, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 329, 331–332 (2013) (predicting negative impact on con-
tributions if deduction lowered or eliminated); Ray D. Madoff, What Leona Helmsley 
Can Teach Us About the Charitable Deduction, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 957, 964 (2010) 
(suggesting charitable giving amounts are resistant to influence of tax policy). 
125 See, CENTER ON PHILANTHROPY AT INDIANA UNIVERSITY, THE 2012 BANK OF 
AMERICA STUDY OF HIGH NET WORTH PHILANTHROPY: ISSUES DRIVING CHARITABLE 
ACTIVITIES AMONG WEALTHY HOUSEHOLDS 56, 71 (Nov. 
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turns out that the same intrinsic rewards that motivate Americans to vo-
lunteer, such as the desire to give back to the community and to set an 
example for others, act to inspire donations as well.126 Along with more 
external benefits such as recognition in the community, these rewards 
have a far greater impact on giving than tax policies do.127 No less of a 
philanthropist than Warren Buffett says that tax implications are irrele-
vant to the charity decisions of the significantly wealthy.128 
However, it would be naïve to pretend that eliminating the charitable 
tax deduction would have no negative impact on the U.S. nonprofit sec-
tor.129 On balance, though, that is not a bad thing. If the deduction goes 
away, it is likely there would be a downsizing of charitable institutions. 
Their hierarchical benefactor-recipient model would be less prevalent, as 
would their heavily marketed messages designed to convince potential 
donors that the needs of the poor are far better covered than they are in 
reality.130 Stripped of these illusions, compassionate Americans would 
join their counterparts in similar nations and support strengthening gov-
ernment-operated institutions that respect all humans as holders of en-
forceable rights, rather than holders of a beggar’s cup.131  The vacuum 
created by the elimination of the charitable tax deduction should be filled 
by the ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights. 
III.   U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT 
ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 
The second stage of the proposed remedy for the U.S. imbalance be-
tween justice and charity is the replacement of the charitable tax deduc-
tion with the long-delayed U.S. ratification of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.132 Ratification of the ICESCR 
would profoundly reshape the nation’s approach to addressing the needs 
of all Americans. 
2012),http://newsroom.bankofamerica.com/files/press_kit/additional/2012_BAC_Study_
of_High_Net_Worth_Philanthropy_0.pdf (49.9% of high net worth households said their 
giving would be unaffected if the charitable deduction was eliminated, less than 10% 
said it would dramatically decrease. The highest proportion (74%) of high net worth 
donors reported giving to charity because “they were moved at how their gift could make 
a difference.”).  
126See id.; Dan Kadlec, Why Limiting the Charity Tax Deduction Won’t Destroy Charities, 
TIME (Dec. 7, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/12/07/why-limiting-the-charity-tax-
deduction-wont-destroy-charities/ (reporting survey results where less than 13% of do-
nors say they are motivated by tax deductions). 
127 Id.  
128 Sweetened Charity, supra note 80.  
129 See Auten et al., supra note 124; Toler, supra note 124. 
130 See Panepento, supra note 92. 
131 See OECD FACTBOOK 2014, supra note 4. 
132 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 7.  
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A.   History of Economic and Social Rights 
The notion of individuals possessing certain economic and social 
rights existed long before there were international treaties and institu-
tions designed to define and protect those rights. As noted above, all ma-
jor religious traditions, and virtually all philosophical approaches, articu-
late a mandate to provide for the needs of the poor and sick, and most 
have done so using language that invokes justice and rights, not mere 
charity.133 Many individual governments have long embraced a respon-
sibility to provide food and shelter for the indigent, as evidenced by pro-
visions in the 18th century Prussian General Code, the 19th century Nor-
wegian Constitution, multiple French constitutions, the social insurance 
programs of late 19th century Germany, and U.S. poor relief systems 
from the same era.134  In the early 20th century, the constitutions of Mex-
ico, the Soviet Union, and the Weimar Republic all articulated a go-
vernmental obligation to address economic and social needs.135 On the 
multilateral level, the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 created the Interna-
tional Labour Organization (“ILO”), which eventually adopted standards 
regarding child labor, work hours, and insurance in the event of injury, 
illness, and old age.136 
In the United States, state constitutions adopted in the 19th and 20th 
centuries often included rights to education, and some articulated rights 
to health and general welfare.137 Beginning in the 19th century, states 
implemented poor relief programs.138 In the 1930’s, New Deal legisla-
tion created ambitious and successful federal social programs designed 
to counteract the effects of the Great Depression, including social securi-
ty and unemployment insurance and multiple efforts that provided gov-
ernment-paid employment to supplement family incomes.139 These pro-
133 See supra notes 30–43 and accompanying text. 
134 See A WORLD MADE NEW, supra note 35, at 185–86. 
135 Id. See also David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 864, 868 (1986).  
136 See e.g., Convention Limiting the Hours of Work in Industrial Undertakings to 
Eight in the Day and Forty-Eight in the Week (adopted Nov. 28, 1919, entered into force 
June 13, 1921); Convention Concerning Minimum Standards of Social Security (adopted 
June 28, 1952, 210 U.N.T.S. 131, entered into force Apr. 27, 1955); Convention Con-
cerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, (adopted June 26, 1973, 1015 
U.N.T.S. 298. entered into force 19 Jun 1976). 
137 Cathy Albisa & Jessica Schultz, The United States: A Ragged Patchwork, in 
SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND 
COMPARATIVE LAW (Malcolm Langford, ed., 2008) at 240. 
138 See Philip Harvey, Joblessness and the Law Before the New Deal, 6 GEO. J. ON 
POVERTY L. & POL'Y 1, 11–41 (1999) (review of English and U.S. poor relief systems); 
THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF 
SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1992) (U.S. had social welfare programs for sol-
diers and their dependents and for mothers and dependent children in the late 19th and 
early 20th century). 
139 See Michael Hiltzik, The New Deal: A Modern History (2011). 
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grams survived both significant political resistance and challenges to 
their constitutionality.140 
President Franklin Roosevelt sought to build on the success of that 
legislation, and the impending end of World War II, in his 1944 State of 
the Union address, where he laid out an agenda he called a “second Bill 
of Rights”: 
We have come to a clear realization of the fact that true 
individual freedom cannot exist without economic secu-
rity and independence. “Necessitous men are not free 
men.” People who are hungry and out of a job are the 
stuff of which dictatorships are made. 
In our day these economic truths have become accepted 
as self-evident. We have accepted, so to speak, a second 
Bill of Rights under which a new basis of security and 
prosperity can be established for all regardless of station, 
race, or creed. 
Among these are: 
The right to a useful and remunerative job in the indus-
tries or shops or farms or mines of the Nation; 
The right to earn enough to provide adequate food and 
clothing and recreation; 
The right of every farmer to raise and sell his products at 
a return which will give him and his family a decent liv-
ing; 
The right of every businessman, large and small, to trade 
in an atmosphere of freedom from unfair competition 
and domination by monopolies at home or abroad; 
The right of every family to a decent home; 
The right to adequate medical care and the opportunity 
to achieve and enjoy good health; 
The right to adequate protection from the economic 
fears of old age, sickness, accident, and unemployment; 
The right to a good education. 
140 See Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) 
(upholding the constitutionality of New Deal labor legislation on the basis that the af-
fected practices impacted interstate commerce, thus allowing for federal intervention 
under Article I sec. 8 of the U.S. Constitution). A Commerce Clause rationale was later 
used by the Court to validate federal legislation on other human rights issues, including 
race discrimination. See, e.g., Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (Title 
II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ruled a valid exercise of Congress’ power under the 
Commerce Clause as applied to a place of public accommodation serving interstate trav-
elers). 
                                                                                                                      
62 Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law [Vol. 23:1 
All of these rights spell security. And after this war is 
won we must be prepared to move forward, in the im-
plementation of these rights, to new goals of human 
happiness and well-being.141 
Roosevelt’s Second Bill of Rights followed his 1941 State of the Union 
address outlining the Four Freedoms: freedom of speech, freedom of 
worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear.142 Both of these 
Roosevelt speeches’ embrace of economic and social rights animated the 
deliberations of the new United Nations, as it considered the terms of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”), which is demon-
strated by a June 1947 U.S. draft of the Declaration that included signifi-
cant support for economic and social rights.143 Roosevelt’s widow, Elea-
nor Roosevelt, served as the first U.S. representative to the UN Human 
Rights Commission, and chaired the Commission and the committee that 
drafted the UDHR.144 She largely joined in the support for the Declara-
tion’s Articles 22 through 28, which include the rights to social security, 
unemployment protection, an adequate standard of living, and free pri-
mary education.145 On December 10, 1948, the UN General Assembly 
passed the Declaration without a dissenting vote.146 Together with its 
two implementing treaties, the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights and the ICESCR, the three documents are considered to con-
stitute the International Bill of Rights.147 
B.   The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights 
The ICESCR articulates the right to social security;148 the right to 
free primary education;149 the right to work, including the right to remu-
141 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, President, United States of America, Annual Mes-
sage to Congress on the State of the Union (January 11, 1944), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=16518. At least one commentator 
says that Roosevelt’s speech may be the greatest of the 20th century. See Lincoln Caplan, 
The Legal Olympian: Cass Sunstein and the Modern Regulatory State, Harv. Mag., Jan–
Feb. 2015, http://harvardmagazine.com/2015/01/the-legal-
olympian#.VJSslGlbqR4.email.  
142 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, President, United States of America, Annual Mes-
sage to Congress on the State of the Union (January 6, 1941), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=16092.  
143 Sally-Anne Way, The “Myth” and Mystery of US History on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights: The 1947 “United States Suggestions for Articles to be Incorpo-
rated in an International Bill of Rights”, 36 HUM. RTS. Q. 868 (2014). 
144 See GLENDON, supra note 35, at 33. 
145 Id. at 156–60. 
147 1948–1949 U.N.Y.B., U.N. Sales No. 150.I.2. 
147 See generally Francesco Francioni, An International Bill of Rights: Why It Mat-
ters, How It Can Be Used, 32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 471 (1997). 
148 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 7, at 
Art 9. 
149 Id. at Art. 13. 
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neration that equates to fair wages and the provision of a decent liv-
ing;150 the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health;151 and the right to an adequate standard of living, defined 
as adequate food, clothing, and housing.152 The right to be free from 
hunger is identified in the text as “fundamental.”153 Despite its title, the 
Covenant does not explicitly place rights in categories of economic, so-
cial, and cultural, and such distinctions among the rights are generally 
ignored.154 The Covenant was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 
1966. As of late 2014, 162 states are parties to the Covenant.155  
The Covenant’s Article 2 places qualifications on a state’s immediate 
obligations, allowing it to “take steps . . . to the maximum of its availa-
ble resources” to eventually “achieve progressively the full realization of 
the rights” in the Covenant.156 The inclusion of such broad rights under 
an abstract mandate like “progressive realization” led to the creation, in 
1985, of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
known as the ESCR Committee.157 The Committee is made up of 18 
independent expert members, hailing from different geographical regions 
and serving four-year terms.158 The Committee reviews reports that state 
parties to the Covenant are required to submit within two years of ratify-
ing the Covenant, and every five years thereafter.159 The reports outline 
the states’ compliance with the Covenant, including the steps taken to-
ward the promised “full realization” of the enumerated economic and 
social rights.160 As is the case in other human rights treaty reporting 
processes, the ESCR Committee is often best informed by critiques of 
the party state’s compliance submitted by non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGO’s) or other advocates.161 The Covenant’s Optional Protocol 
150 Id. at Arts. 6–7. 
151 Id. at Art. 12. 
152 Id. at Art. 11. 
153 Id. at Art. 11, ¶ 2. 
154 Henry J. Steiner, Philip Alston & Ryan Goodman, International Human Right in 
Context: Law, Politics, Morals 276 (2007). 
155 United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Right, https://treaties.un.org/ 
pages/viewdetails.aspx?chapter=4&lang=en&mtdsg_no=iv-3&src=treaty.  
156 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 7, at 
Art. 2. 
157 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council Res. 1985/17, Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. E/1985/85, at 
15 (May 28, 1985). 
158 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CESCR/Pages/CESCRIndex.aspx.  
159 Provisional Rules of Procedure Adopted by the Committee at its Third Session, 
Rule 58, E.S.C., E/C.12/1990/4/Rev.1 (1989).  
160 Id. 
161 See generally AMNESTY INT’L, Holding Government to Account: A Guide to 
Shadow Reporting on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (2014), 
http://www.flac.ie/download/pdf/cescr_guide_to_shadow_reporting_final_20052014.pdf; 
                                                                                                                      
64 Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law [Vol. 23:1 
of 2008 creates a complaint procedure where individuals and organiza-
tions can access a quasi-judicial process that receives and reviews 
charges of party states’ non-compliance.162 Under the Optional Protocol, 
state parties may also agree to allow the Committee to make more gener-
al inquiries and recommendations on “grave or systematic violations” of 
the Convention.163  
The Committee also issues General Comments, which have proven 
to be instrumental in clarifying states’ duties under the Covenant.164 In 
particular, the Committee addressed “The Nature of State Parties’ Obli-
gations” in General Comment 3 in 1990, articulating a “minimum core” 
that has given shape to the broad outlines of the economic and social 
obligations owed to individuals: 
On the basis of the extensive experience gained by the 
Committee, as well as by the body that preceded it, over 
a period of more than a decade of examining States par-
ties’ reports the Committee is of the view that a mini-
mum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the 
very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights 
is incumbent upon every State party. Thus, for example, 
a State party in which any significant number of indi-
viduals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential 
primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of 
the most basic forms of education is, prima facie, failing 
to discharge its obligations under the Covenant. If the 
Covenant were to be read in such a way as not to estab-
lish such a minimum core obligation, it would be largely 
deprived of its raison d’être. By the same token, it must 
be noted that any assessment as to whether a State has 
discharged its minimum core obligation must also take 
account of resource constraints applying within the 
country concerned. Article 2 (1) obligates each State 
party to take the necessary steps “to the maximum of its 
available resources.” In order for a State party to be able 
to attribute its failure to meet at least its minimum core 
see also, U.N. Office of the High Comm’r of Human Rights, CESCR—International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 53 Session (10 Nov. 2014 – 28 Nov. 
2014),http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/SessionDetails1.aspx?Sessi
onID=822&Lang=en (showing, for example, that more than two dozen civil society or-
ganizations submitted reports to the Committee to consider as it reviewed Romania’s 
ICESCR compliance during the Committee’s 53rd session). 
162 G.A. Res. 63/117, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/117 (Dec. 10, 2008).  
163 Id. at art. 11, para. 2. 
164 See generally Kerstin Mechlem, Treaty Bodies and the Interpretation of Human 
Rights, 42 VAND J. TRANSNAT’L L. 905, 926–31 (2009); Philip Alston, 
The General Comments of the UN Committee On Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
104 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 4 (2010). 
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obligations to a lack of available resources it must dem-
onstrate that every effort has been made to use all re-
sources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, 
as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations.165  
The Committee’s General Comments have also provided specific guide-
lines for compliance with many of the Covenant’s provisions, including 
education (“The nature of this [free primary education] requirement is 
unequivocal.”—Comment 11, 1999166) and housing (“the right to hous-
ing should not be interpreted in a narrow or restrictive sense . . . it should 
be seen as the right to somewhere live in security, peace, and dignity.”—
Comment 4, 1991167). The Committee has also employed the Comments 
process to refute any perception that the Covenant requires a socialist 
system of government: “[The Covenant does not demand] any particular 
form of government or economic system being used as the vehicle for 
the steps in question, provided only that it is democratic and that all hu-
man rights are thereby respected . . . .”168 
The ICESCR is far from being the only international legal instru-
ment recognizing economic and social rights. In the decades since the 
passage of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, most countries 
that have written new constitutions have included the rights to social se-
curity, food, health care, and housing.169 The ILO Conventions,170 the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child,171 the Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,172 and the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women173 all 
reference a range of economic and social rights. The same is true for re-
gional human rights treaties, including the African Charter on Human 
165 Comm. on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3: The 
Nature of States Parties’ Obligations, ¶10, U.N. Doc E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990). 
166 Comm. on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 11: 
Plans of Action for Primary Education, art. 14, U.N. Doc E/C.12/1999/4 (May 10, 1999). 
167 Comm. on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 4: The 
Right to Adequate Housing, art. 11, U.N. Doc E/1992/23 (Dec. 13, 1991). 
168 Comm. on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 166. 
169 MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL 
WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 220 (2008). See also CASS 
SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 222 (2001).  
170 See supra note 137. 
171 G.A. Res. 44/25, 44 U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/736 
(1989) (including obligations to ensure the survival and development of the child, art. 6, 
special care for children with disabilities, art. 23, and the highest attainable standard of 
health, art. 24). 
172 G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, art. 5, U.N. Doc. 
A/6014 (Dec. 21, 1965), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (including obligations to respect without 
discrimination economic and social rights generally, and housing and health and 
workplace rights in particular, art. 5). 
173 G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N.Doc. 
A/34/46 (1979) (including obligations to respect without discrimination economic and 
social rights generally, and health care and family benefits in particular, arts. 12 and 13).  
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and People’s Rights,174 the European Social Charter,175 and the Protocol 
of San Salvador to the American Convention on Human Rights.176 
 In fact, the global response to poverty, suffering, and inequality is 
increasingly framed in the language of human rights. 177 Former UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson said, “I am often 
asked what is the most serious form of human rights violations in the 
world today, and my reply is consistent: extreme poverty.”178 The Vien-
na Declaration of the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights stated, 
“[T]he existence of widespread extreme poverty inhibits the full and ef-
fective enjoyment of human rights.” 179  Nelson Mandela said that 
“[M]assive poverty and obscene inequality are such terrible scourges of 
our times—times in which the world boasts breathtaking advances in 
science, technology, industry, and wealth accumulation—that they have 
to rank alongside slavery and apartheid as social evils.”180 Seventy years 
after Franklin Roosevelt made the case that economic and social needs 
are in fact rights deserving of fulfillment, that recognition has become 
the global norm—with the notable exception of Roosevelt’s own United 
States of America. 
C.   The United States and Economic and Social Rights 
Unlike most national constitutions, and the vast majority of constitu-
tions adopted after World War II, the U.S. Constitution contains no ex-
plicit guarantees of economic or social rights. As Judge Richard Posner 
has written, “The men who wrote the Bill of Rights were not concerned 
that the federal government might do too little for the people, but that it 
might do too much for them.”181 The rights protected under the U.S. 
174 Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human and People's Rights, 
adopted June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217 (including the rights to health, work, and 
education in arts. 15-17). 
175 Council of Europe, European Social Charter, opened for signature Oct. 18, 1961, 
529 U.N.T.S. 89 (including rights to fair remuneration for work, art. 4, and social securi-
ty, art. 12). 
176  Organization of American States, Additional Protocol (of 
San Salvador) to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights of 14 November 1988, 28 I.L.M 161 (1989) (including rights 
to food, art. 12, and unionization, art. 8).  
177  See Poverty and Human Rights, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/issues/poverty-and-human-rights.  
178 UNDP, Poverty Reduction and Human Rights: A Practice Note, at iv (2003), 
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/democratic-
governance/dg-publications-for-website/poverty-reduction-and-human-rights-practice-
note/HRPN_%28poverty%29En.pdf.  
179 World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Ac-
tion, ¶14, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (June 25, 1993). 
180 See In Full: Mandela’s Poverty Speech, supra note 49. 
181 Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 
U.S. 1049 (1983). Unlike most other democratic constitutions, the U.S. document was 
written before the advent of the modern welfare state. See Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in 
Twentieth Century Constitutions, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 521 (1992). 
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Constitution fall almost exclusively into the civil and political rights cat-
egory, with even the Constitution’s protections against government-
sanctioned discrimination given a more limited interpretation than inter-
national law generally calls for.182   
For a time in the mid-20th century, it appeared that the U.S. Supreme 
Court may read into the Constitution implicit guarantees of economic 
and social rights.183  In 1954, a unanimous Court in Brown v. Board of 
Education cited education as a prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of 
all rights as a citizen.184 The Court later struck down new-resident wait-
ing periods for welfare benefits185 and ruled that the Due Process Claus-
es’ protection of property interests encompassed welfare payments.186 In 
the latter case, Goldberg v. Kelly, the Court even quoted the Constitu-
tion’s preamble when delivering a constitutional affirmation of the value 
of justice over charity: 
[W]elfare . . . can help bring within the reach of the poor 
the same opportunities that are available to others to par-
ticipate meaningfully in the life of the community. . . 
Public assistance, then, is not mere charity, but a means 
to “promote the general Welfare, and secure the Bless-
ings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.”187 
But the Court would go no further down the path toward enforceable 
economic and social rights. In 1973, the Court in San Antonio Indepen-
dent School District v. Rodriguez rejected the notion of a federal consti-
tutional right to education,188 and on multiple other occasions reaffirmed 
that most social and economic legislative classifications are immune 
from constitutional challenges under the Equal Protection Clause.189 The 
Court aggressively rejected an argument of implicit economic and social 
constitutional rights in the case of Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dept. 
of Social Services, ruling that the “Due Process Clauses generally confer 
no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be 
182 See Albisa and Schultz, supra note 137 at 235. (“[I]nternational norms prohibit 
discrimination where it has either a discriminatory purpose or effect, while U.S. juri-
sprudence requires both simultaneously.” (emphasis added) (citing the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination). 
183 See Cass Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Eco-
nomic Guarantees?, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 22 (2005) (speculating that “Social and 
economic rights, American style” could have been established by the Court if Hubert 
Humphrey had defeated Richard Nixon in the U.S. Presidential election of 1968, thus 
allowing Humphrey to make several appointments to the Supreme Court). 
184 Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
185 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
186 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970). 
187 Id. at 265 (quoting U.S. CONST. pmbl.). 
188 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). 
189 See, e.g., Id. at 40; Lindsay v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972); Dandridge v. 
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). 
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necessary to secure life.”190  Ultimately, when the U.S. executive and 
legislative branches in the late 19th century and early 20th century tore 
holes in the safety net once provided by welfare and food programs, 
there was no constitutional barrier protecting the poor from these devas-
tating decisions by the political branches of government.191 
Nor were those legislative and executive actions barred by the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as the Unit-
ed States is the only western democracy to have failed to ratify the Co-
venant.192 In 1966, under President Lyndon Johnson’s administration, 
the United States voted in the UN General Assembly to adopt the Cove-
nant.193 In 1978, President Jimmy Carter signed the Covenant and sub-
mitted it to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent pursuant to Article 
II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution.194 But, although the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights achieved Senate approval and 
was ratified by the United States in 1992, the Senate has never taken up 
the ICESCR and no presidential administration since Carter’s has asked 
the Senate to do so.195  
The lack of a federal constitutional or treaty obligation to honor eco-
nomic and social rights does not mean such rights are completely foreign 
to U.S. approaches to domestic or international policy. As noted above, 
many state constitutions articulate rights to education, and some include 
language outlining a state government commitment to general welfare 
and public health.196 Some state courts have seized on these provisions, 
and the federal constitution’s reservation of power to the states through 
the Tenth Amendment, to find enforceable economic and social rights for 
190 Deshaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dept. of Soc. Servs. 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989). 
191 See generally R. KENT WEAVER, ENDING WELFARE AS WE KNOW IT (2000) (re-
viewing 1990s welfare reform legislation, including the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Act and the elimination of the entitlement program Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children); Stacy Dean and Dottie Rosenbaum, CTR. ON BUDGET POLICY 
AND PRIORITIES, Snap Benefits Will Be Cut for Nearly All Participants in November 2013 
(2013), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=3899.  
192. See U.N. Office of the High Comm’r of Human Rights, supra note 12.  
193 See G.A. Res. 2200A, supra note 7. 
194  Jimmy Carter, Human Rights Treaties Message to the Senate (Feb. 23, 
1978), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=30399.  
195 See Philip Alston, U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: The Need for an Entirely New Strategy, 84 AM. J. OF INTL. LAW 365, 
377 (1990). (Even the Carter administration did not provide full-throated advocacy of the 
ICESCR. The president’s representatives downplayed the mandates of the Covenant as 
only “a declaration of aims” without any commitment to present implementation. In 
accordance with the highly controversial U.S. practice of agreeing to human rights trea-
ties only after first affixing reservations, understandings, and declarations aimed at blunt-
ing the treaties’ enforceability against the U.S., the Carter administration recommended 
the Senate ratify the ICESCR only after it included the following “understanding”: “The 
United States understands paragraph (1) of Article 2 as establishing that the provisions of 
Articles 2 through 15 of this Covenant describe goals to be achieved progressively rather 
than through immediate implementation.” See Carter, id. 
196 See ALBISA & SCHULTZ, supra note 137. 
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residents of those individual states.197 The New Deal protections of labor 
rights, social security, and unemployment compensation have retained 
their foothold in the U.S. system for several generations, and the 1960’s 
U.S. “War on Poverty” led to increased social programs.198 At the inter-
national level, the United States in 1989 signed the Vienna Declaration 
of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (also known 
as the Helsinki process), agreeing that “the promotion of economic, so-
cial, cultural rights . . . is of paramount importance for human dignity 
and for the attainment of the legitimate aspirations of every individu-
al.”199 The United States was also one of the nations that affirmed the 
interdependence of all human rights at the 1993 World Conference on 
Human Rights in Vienna.200 The U.S. State Department’s annual Coun-
try Reports on Human Rights Practices includes reviews of labor 
rights.201  
But efforts to cement economic and social rights into U.S. law via 
treaty ratification have been met with spirited resistance. Concerns have 
included the potential for loss of sovereignty to a global cooperative, 
encroachment on individual states’ rights under the U.S. system of fede-
ralism, and the allegedly socialist nature of economic and social 
rights.202 Some U.S. opponents have labeled the ICESCR as the “Cove-
nant on Uneconomic, Socialist, and Collective Rights.”203 More broadly, 
anti-ESCR sentiment echoes resistance that has been expressed to U.S. 
ratification of any human rights treaty. In the 1950’s, Senator John W. 
Bricker proposed a series of constitutional amendments that would have 
significantly limited the capacity of the United States to enter into bind-
197 See Martha Davis, The Spirit of Our Times: State Constitutions and International 
Human Rights Law, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 359, 360 (2006) (Arguing that 
state courts are fertile ground for future economic and social rights advocacy via litiga-
tion); Barbara Stark, Economic Rights in the United States and International Human 
Rights Law: Toward an Entirely New Strategy, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 79, 98 (1992). 
198  See generally COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC ADVISERS, THE WAR ON POVERTY 50 
YEARS LATER: A PROGRESS REPORT (2014), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/50th_anniversary_cea_report_-
_final_post_embargo.pdf. But, as noted above, some of these economic and social pro-
grams have been cut in the 1990s and early 21st century, see supra note 192. 
199  Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Concluding Document 
from the Vienna Meeting, American Society of International Law, 28 I.L.M. 527, 534, 
para. 14 (1989). 
200 U.N. World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme 
of Action, American Society of International Law, 32 I.L.M 1661, 1665, para. 5 (1993) 
(declaring that “All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and inter-
related.”). 
201 U.S. Dept. of State, Human Rights Reports, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/. 
202  See Duncan B. Hollis, Executive Federalism: Forging New Federalist Con-
straints on the Treaty Power, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1327, 1381 (2006). 
203 Alston, supra note 195, at 366. 
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ing treaties.204 The Eisenhower Administration responded by pledging 
not to submit any human rights treaties for Senate consideration.205 
Nearly four decades later, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
finally earned Senate approval.206 The Reagan administration State De-
partment issued a 1981 memorandum attempting to define economic and 
social rights out of existence altogether, insisting that human rights in 
U.S. foreign policy were to be construed as solely political rights and 
civil liberties.207  Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams defended 
the policy in testimony to Congress the following year: “[T]he rights that 
no government can violate, [i.e. civil and political rights], should not be 
watered down to the status of rights that governments should do their 
best to secure, [i.e. economic, social and cultural rights].”208 A Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights in the Reagan administra-
tion labeled economic and social rights as “myths.”209 Subsequent presi-
dential administrations did not display the same overt level of hostility to 
the concept of economic and social rights, but did oppose international 
references to the rights to food and housing,210 and AIDS treatment.211 
D.   Arguments Against U.S. Ratification of the ICESCR 
The sharp-edged rhetoric in opposition to economic and social rights 
can create a temptation to dismiss the U.S. resistance as reactionary or 
even xenophobic. But, often, there are principled objections to U.S. rati-
fication of the ICESCR. Before delivering the argument in favor of rati-
fication, it is important to outline these objections. 
1.   Economic and social rights are contrary to the law and character of 
the U.S. 
The Bricker Amendment in the 1950s and the Reagan administration 
efforts in the 1980s are extreme examples, but their opposition did re-
204 See generally DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY: A 
TEST OF EISENHOWER’S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP (1988). 
205  JEREMY A. RABKIN, LAW WITHOUT NATIONS?: WHY CONSTITUTIONAL 
GOVERNMENT REQUIRES SOVEREIGN STATES 125–26 (2005). 
206 138 CONG. REC. 8068–71 (1992). 
207 Excerpts from State Department Memo on Human Rights, N.Y. Times (Nov. 5, 
1981), http://www.nytimes.com/1981/11/05/world/excerpts-from-state-department-
memo-on-human-rights.html.  
208 Review of State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 
1981: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and International Organizations 
of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong. (1982) (statement of Elliott Abrams, 
Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs). 
209 Paula Dobriansky, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Human Rights and Humanitarian Af-
fairs, Address before the American Council of Young Political Leaders, Washington, D.C. 
(June 3, 1988), in DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, CURRENT POL’Y NO. 
1091, at 2).  
210 Stein et al, supra note 154, at 281. 
211 Albisa & Schultz, supra note 137, at 230. 
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flect a broader U.S. discomfort with economic and social rights.212 One 
argument against ratifying the ICESCR in the United States is that the 
treaty’s obligations placed on the national government would contradict 
the U.S. legacy under the Tenth Amendment of granting to individual 
states the power to devise and implement economic and social program-
ming.213 This federalism objection had an undeniably racist tint in the 
Bricker Amendment era—southern states did not want anti-
discrimination treaty provisions to interfere with their Jim Crow practic-
es.214 The extent of states’ current autonomy in the economic and social 
arena eighty years after the New Deal is certainly debatable.215 But the 
federalism legacy in the United States retains a strong presence in public 
dialogue, especially when coupled with state constitutional provisions 
for economic and social rights.216  
An even more deep-seated source of U.S. resistance to the ICESCR 
is its association with the collectivist philosophies of communism and 
socialism.217 Although the Cold War between capitalist and communist 
states is long concluded, the United States continues to define itself in-
ternally, and internationally, as an individualistic culture.218 In a country 
where “Don’t Tread on Me” flags and bumper stickers are still quite pre-
valent,219 and a Tea Party anti-government movement has had significant 
political impact in the 21st century,220 the limited-government character 
212 The U.S. has been slow to embrace even civil and political rights, as evidenced 
by its delayed ratification of the ICCPR and its history of attaching reservations, under-
standings, and declarations to the treaties it does ratify. See Harold Koh, The Future of 
Lou Henkin's Human Rights Movement, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 487, 490 
(2007). (“In the cathedral of human rights, the United States is more like a flying buttress 
than a pillar--choosing to stand outside the international structure supporting the interna-
tional human rights system, but without being willing to subject its own conduct to the 
scrutiny of that system.”). 
213 Hollis, supra note 202.  
214 See e.g., Fuji v. State, 217 P.2d 481 (Cal. App. 1950), aff’d. on other grounds, 38 
Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952) (demonstrating that The Bricker Amendment move-
ment was spurred in part by decisions like the California Court of Appeals ruling in Fuji 
that the U.N. Charter equated to a binding treaty obligation that under the Supremacy 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution superseded inconsistent state legislation—in this case, 
restricting alien land ownership).  
215 See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
421, 425 (1987). 
216 See Stark & Davis, supra note 197. 
217 See, e.g., ROBERT W. LEE, THE UNITED NATIONS CONSPIRACY 108 (1981); Alston, 
supra note 195, at 366. 
218 See, e.g., Sharon Jayson, What's On Americans' Minds? Increasingly, ‘Me’, USA 
Today, (Jul. 10, 2012, 6:29 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/ 
news/health/story/2012-07-10/individualist-language-in-books/56134152/1.  
219 See Tom Scocca, What is the Tea Party Waving, Exactly?, Boston Globe (June 
13, 2010), http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/ 
2010/06/13/flag_daze/. 
220 See William Galston, The Tea Party and the GOP Crackup, Wall St. J. (October 
15, 2013, 6:52 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424052702303376904579135231053555194; Tami Luhby, Romney-Ryan 
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of civil and political rights offers a more comfortable fit than the expan-
sive government role anticipated by the ICESCR.221  One U.S. commen-
tator’s comparison of the different challenges for implementing civil and 
political rights versus economic and social rights contrasts the activist 
role for government in the economic and social arena with the limited 
“night watchman” role in protecting against violations of civil and politi-
cal rights—and finds the night watchman role to be more appropriate.222 
Some critics have derisively labeled the ICESCR as the “holidays with 
pay treaty.”223 A Cold War-era writer said, “[t]he Covenant is a socialist 
blueprint that encourages open-ended government meddling of the sort 
on which dictators thrive.”224 This concern dates back before the Cove-
nant. American Bar Association president Frank Holman in 1948 labeled 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as “a proposal for world-
wide socialism to be imposed in the U.S. and on every other member 
nation.”225 
2.   Economic and social rights are inferior to civil and political rights 
The United States’ ratification of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, which largely tracks the guarantees in the U.S. Con-
stitution, is instructive. Even some staunch human rights advocates ex-
plicitly or implicitly elevate civil and political rights over economic and 
social rights. Aryeh Neier, a leading U.S. human rights activist who has 
directed Human Rights Watch and the American Civil Liberties Union, 
and served as president of the Open Society Institute, argues that a more 
just distribution of the world’s resources cannot come from assertion of 
human rights.226 In fact, Neier and others believe that the necessarily 
uncertain markers gauging progressive realization of economic and so-
cial rights could lead to a watering down of civil and political rights: 
With social and economic rights . . . it is inevitable that 
they are going to be applied differently in different plac-
Would Overhaul Medicaid, Cnn Money (Aug. 13, 2012, 12:13 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2012/08/13/news/economy/ryan-medicaid/ (Rep. Paul Ryan, the 
Republican candidate for Vice President in 2012, saying the social welfare safety net is 
at risk of becoming “a hammock that lulls able-bodied people into lives of dependency 
and complacency, that drains them of their will and their incentive to make the most of 
their lives.”).  
221 See Neier, supra note 9, at 31 (arguing that economic rights do not have their 
roots in “Natural Law” as civil and political rights do). But see note 192 supra (demon-
strating that the ICESCR has been ratified by most capitalistic democracies, including all 
of the U.S.’ closest economic allies in western Europe.). 
222 DAVID KELLEY, A LIFE OF ONE’S OWN: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE WELFARE 
STATE 26 (1998). 
223 Alston, supra note 195, at 368.  
224 Lee, supra note 217. 
225 Albisa & Schultz, supra note 137, at 233. 
226 Aryeh Neier, Social and Economic Rights: A Critique, 13 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 1 
(2006); see also Neier, supra note 9, at 68. 
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es. That is, if you are talking about one country with ex-
tensive resources and one that is very poor, there is not 
going to be the same right to shelter or to health care. . . . 
But suppose that one takes that same idea — that differ-
ent stages of development mean different things for each 
country — and applies it to the concept of civil and po-
litical rights. Suppose China or Zimbabwe says it is not 
a developed country and therefore cannot provide the 
same civil and political rights as a developed country . . . 
Therefore, I think it is dangerous to allow this idea of 
social and economic rights to flourish . . .227 
Human Rights Watch is now openly advocating for economic and social 
rights,228 and Amnesty International also argues for economic and social 
rights as well as civil and political rights.229  But their advocacy in the 
economic and social rights arena is comparatively less robust, and Hu-
man Rights Watch executive director Kenneth Roth has confessed to “a 
sense of futility” among traditional civil and political rights advocates 
making their way in the promotion of economic and social rights.230 
Economic and social rights’ “little brother” status to civil and politi-
cal rights is an observable phenomenon even in states that have ratified 
the ICESCR, as the ESCR Committee noted with dismay in its statement 
to the Vienna World Conference in 1993: 
“[S]tates and the international community as a whole 
continue to tolerate all too often breaches of economic, 
social, and cultural rights which, if they occurred in rela-
tion to civil and political rights, would provoke expres-
227 Neier, supra note 226, at 2–3; see also Cass Sunstein, Against Positive Rights, 2 
EAST EUR. CONST’L. REV. 35, 36 (1993) (“[T]here is a big difference between what a 
decent society and what a constitution should guarantee . . . If the Constitution tries to 
specify everything to which a decent society commits itself, it threatens to become a 
mere piece of paper, worth nothing in the real world . . . If the right to the highest possi-
ble level of physical health is not subject to judicial enforcement, perhaps the same will 
become true of the right to free speech and to due process of law.”). But, by 2001, Suns-
tein appeared to be more amenable to economic and social rights in constitutions. See 
Sunstein, supra note 170, at 223 (“If minimal socio-economic rights will be protected 
democratically, why involve the Constitution? The best answer is to doubt the assump-
tion and to insist that such rights are indeed at systemic risk in political life, especially 
because those who would benefit from them lack political power. It is not clear if that is 
true in every nation. But it is certainly true in many places.”).  
228 See e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Human Rights Watch Submission to the United 
Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Advance of its Review on 
Greece August 2015, (August 25, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/25/human-
rights-watch-submission-united-nations-committee-economic-social-and-cultural. 
229  See Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/economic-social-and-cultural-rights.  
230 Kenneth Roth, Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Is-
sues Faced by an International Human Rights Organization, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 63, 72 
(2004). 
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sions of horror and outrage . . . In effect, despite the rhe-
toric, violations of civil and political rights continue to 
be treated as though they were far more serious, and 
more patently intolerable, than massive and direct de-
nials of economic, social and cultural rights . . .231 
In its struggle to enforce economic and social rights as vigorously as civ-
il and political rights, the United States is clearly not alone. 
3.   Economic and social rights are not justiciable 
As the statements of Neier and other advocates suggest, one source 
of their preference for civil and political rights is that those rights are 
seen to be justiciable in a way economic and social rights are not. As 
Neier has stated, 
The concern that I have with economic and social rights 
is when there are broad assertions of the sort that appear 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or that 
appear in the South African Constitution, which speak 
broadly of a right to shelter or housing, a right to educa-
tion, a right to social security, a right to a job, and a right 
to health care. There, I think, we get into territory that is 
unmanageable through the judicial process and that in-
trudes fundamentally into an area where the democratic 
process ought to prevail.232 
The argument that economic and social rights are “unmanageable 
through the judicial process,” and thus not justiciable, can be reduced to 
two points: courts do not possess the legitimacy or the competency to 
adjudicate economic and social rights. 
The legitimacy argument asserts, as Neier’s statement suggests, that 
the judiciary is not the correct branch of government to be making deci-
sions involving economic and social rights.233 A democratically-elected 
legislature and executive, with more transparent deliberative processes 
and direct accountability to the electorate are the proper bodies to be 
reaching decisions on economic and social matters.234 A judge-issued 
ruling on an alleged economic and social rights violation risks the possi-
bility of “queue jumping,” since the issue is presented to the court with-
231 Comm. on Economic, Social, Cultural Rights on Eighteenth and Nineteenth Ses-
sions, U.N. Doc E/1993/22, Ann. III, at 83 (1999). 
232 Neier, supra note 226. 
233 See Neier, supra note 9, at 83 (“Alexander Hamilton, writing in the Federalist 
Papers famously called the judiciary the ‘least dangerous’ branch of government because 
it has ‘neither the power of the purse nor the power of the sword.’”). 
234 See Michael J. Dennis & David P. Stewart, Justiciability of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: Should There Be an International Complaint Mechanism to Adjudi-
cate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health? 98 AM. J. INT’L. L. 462, 467 
(2004). 
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out the context of competing needs.235   If the courts do consider the 
broader economic and social landscape, the argument goes, there would 
be virtually no limit to their jurisdiction. As one scholar has written 
about adjudication of economic and social rights, “In the end, we would 
have the courts running everything—raising taxes and deciding how the 
money should be spent.”236  
Concerns are also lodged about courts overstepping not just their po-
litical legitimacy, but also exceeding the boundaries of their competen-
cy.237 The worry is that economic and social rights are too complex, 
costly, and vague for judges to appropriately enforce.238 Courts lack tax-
ing authority, along with the depth of knowledge and breadth of availa-
ble interventions that are available to a bureaucracy.239  Confronted by 
these challenges, scholars have predicted, courts will limit themselves to 
a position of deference to the political branches.240 There are certainly 
examples of just that sort of judicial deference, including English Court 
of Appeals and South African Constitutional Court decisions that al-
lowed the political branches to determine the scope of the right to health 
care.241 In the case of R v. Cambridge Health Authority, ex parte B, in-
volving a request to mandate the state-run health services to provide 
cancer treatment to a girl despite its low probability of success, the court 
wrote, “Difficult and agonizing judgments have to be made as to how a 
limited budget is best allocated to the maximum advantage of the maxi-
mum number of patients. That is not a judgment the court can 
make . . . .”242 
235 See James L. Cavallaro & Emily J. Schaffer, Less as More: Rethinking Suprana-
tional Litigation of Economic and Social Rights in the Americas, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 217, 
236–38 (2004). 
236 MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999) 
(Tushnet is among several scholars who have argued that courts’ role in enforcing eco-
nomic and social rights should be limited to citing economic and social rights violations 
but leaving the remedy to the political branches of government.); see also David Landau, 
The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement, 53 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 189, 192 (2012).   
237 See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the 
Constitution, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 695, 700 (1979) (“Courts simply are not equipped, 
much less authorized, to make such decisions.”); Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive 
Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 924 (2001) (“The case [for economic and social rights] 
erroneously presumes that the courts can discern the policy best suited to achieving the 
desired consequential ends, when in fact the legislature is better suited for this goal.”).  
238 Alana Klein, Judging as Nudging: New Governance Approaches for the En-
forcement of Constitutional Social and Economic Rights, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
351, 353–54 (2008).  
239 Sunstein, supra note 228. 
240 Frank I. Michelman, The Constitution, Social Rights, and Liberal Political Justi-
fication, 1 INT’L. J. CONST. L. 13, 29 (2003). 
241 R v. Cambridge Health Auth., ex parte B (1995) 1 W.L.R. 898; see also Soo-
bramoney v. Minister of Health, Kwazulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) at 776 (S. Afr.). 
242 R v. Cambridge Health Auth., 1 W.L.R. at 906 (1995). 
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E.   Arguments for U.S. Ratification of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
1.   Ratification of the ICESCR would lead to improved economic and 
social conditions for the U.S. poor 
While it is beyond the scope of this article to lay out a strategy to 
push the United States toward ratification of the ICESCR,243 there is no 
question that ratification of the Covenant would be a transformative 
event in the evolution of the political and moral character of the United 
States.244 Human rights instruments are normative, meaning they create 
a set of expectations designed to spur governmental and societal beha-
vior. 245  The process of public discussions, official deliberations and 
eventual ratification of human rights treaties is sometimes compared to a 
cascade that eventually leads to better conditions for affected persons.246 
Recent empirical research has confirmed widespread achievement of the 
normative goals of human rights treaties: improvements in the respect 
for, and protection of, human rights in countries that ratify the instru-
ments.247 While full compliance with the ICESCR among its current 
243 Although there is a clear need for a modern and considered articulation of that 
strategy, blueprints for ratification efforts have been offered by scholars. See Alston, 
supra note 196; Robert Traer, U.S. Ratification of the ICESCR?, 
http://religionhumanrights.com/Law/ICESCR/usrat.icescr.htm; Barbara Stark, At Last? 
Ratification of the Economic Covenant as a Congressional-Executive Agreement, 20 
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 109 (2011) (“The Covenant faces difficult, but 
not insurmountable, obstacles. Ratification is no more improbable than the election of a 
black president.”). 
244 See, Megan McLemore, Dispatches: One More Healthcare Challenge for the 
U.S., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (June 29, 2015), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/29/dispatches-one-more-healthcare-challenge-
us#st_refDomain=&st_refQuery (senior researcher at Human Rights Watch arguing that 
“human right to health” rhetoric by President Barack Obama and tangible gains achieved 
by the U.S. Affordable Care Act should be formalized by U.S. ratification of the 
ICESCR).  
245 Frank I. Michelman, Socioeconomic Rights in Constitutional Law: Explaining 
America Away, 6 INT’L. J. CONST. L. 663, 667 (2008). 
246 Eibe Reidel, The Human Right to Water and General Comment No. 15 of the 
CESCR, in THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER 19, 35 (E. Reidel & P. Rothen, eds., 2006). See 
also Glendon, supra note 36, at 218 (discussing how the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights helped spur the creation of global human rights advocacy organizations and 
how the 1975 Helsinki Accords helped spur freedom movements in the Soviet Union, 
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, despite the fact that neither document’s human 
rights terms were binding). 
247 Christopher J. Farris, Respect for Human Rights has Improved Over Time: Mod-
eling the Changing Standard of Accountability in Human Rights Documents, 108 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 297 (2014); Christopher J. Farris, The Changing Standard of Accountabil-
ity and the Positive Relationship between Human Rights Treaty Ratification and Com-
pliance, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK (Nov. 16, 2014) 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2517457 (arguing that changing standards of human rights ac-
countability explain the opposite conclusions of Eric Neumayer, Do International Hu-
man Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?, 49 J.OF CONFLICT RESOL. 925, 
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parties is far from a reality, certain of its rights—including the right to 
primary school education and some food, housing, and labor rights—are 
widely respected.248 
The efficacy of human rights treaty instruments is derived not just 
from the language of rights but from the forums provided for asserting 
those rights and registering complaints when they have not been res-
pected.249 The ESCR Committee has stated that a forum and access to 
remedies for rights violations are necessary for compliance with the Co-
venant.250 As Nolan, et al. have written, the process of formal “witness” 
has a special power to push the needle toward a greater respect for hu-
man rights: “Most people who have participated in human rights hear-
ings at the domestic or regional level will have experienced a kind of 
pivotal moment in the adjudication of a human rights claim when, 
through the ‘voice’ of the rights claimant, the subjective struggle for dig-
nity and security breaks through the legal argument to bring home the 
real issues of human dignity that are at stake in a claim.” 251 
The United States’ lack of a strong history of respecting economic 
and social rights provides a strong rationale for—not against—the adop-
tion of the ICESCR, especially when viewed in the context of an unsatis-
factory status quo: enduring and widespread U.S. poverty.252 U.S. excep-
tionalism in the economic and social rights arena is evidenced by the text 
of the U.S. constitution, the narrow judicial interpretation of that consti-
tution in the context of economic and social rights, and the refusal to 
944–49 (December 2005); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Dif-
ference? 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1976–2000 (2002).). See, also, Michael O’Flaherty, Hu-
man Rights Law Makes a Difference, OPENGLOBALRIGHTS, (Dec. 12, 2014) 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/michael-o%E2%80%99flaherty/ 
human-rights-law-makes-difference (eight-year member of UN Human Rights Commit-
tee, the treaty body that monitors implementation of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, providing anecdotal evidence of rights strengthening related to trea-
ty compliance). 
248 STEINER ET AL., supra note 155, at 282. 
249 See Eva Brems & Laurens Lavrysen, Procedural Justice in Human Rights Adju-
dication: The European Court of Human Rights, 35 HUM. RTS. Q. 176, 177–85 (Feb. 
2013). 
250 See Comm. on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 165. 
251 Aoife Nolan et al., The Justiciability of Social and Economic Rights: An Updated 
Appraisal, Center for Human Rights and the Global Justice Working Paper No. 15, 4 
(2007). 
252 See Stark, supra note 243, at 113 (“[t]he norms of the Covenant are, in fact, 
norms that are widely accepted in the United States. Most Americans do not want men-
tally ill people to sleep on the street or children to go hungry”). Stark’s assertion gains 
some support from popular rhetoric from some U.S. leaders, including Franklin Roose-
velt’s Four Freedoms, supra note 143; Dr. Martin Luther King’s statement, “What good 
is it to have the right to sit at a lunch counter if you can’t afford a hamburger,” Peter 
Dreier, Martin Luther King Was a Radical, Not a Saint, HUFF. POST, Jan. 20, 2013; and 
President Barack Obama’s statement, “[I]t matters little if you have the right to sit at the 
front of the bus if you can't afford the bus fare.” Senator Barack Obama, Remarks of 
Senator Barack Obama at the 99th Annual Convention of the NAACP (July 14, 2008), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=77650. 
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ratify economic and social rights instruments.253 This gap in legal rights 
has contributed to the vacuum of economic and social justice, as well as 
the absence of effective state intervention on behalf of the poor and the 
sick of a comparatively wealthy country.254  Certainly, ratification of the 
ICESCR in the United States will necessitate overcoming the entrenched 
domestic political opposition to economic and social rights. But that 
challenge presents a blessing in disguise, as the thorough debate will 
ensure that eventual ratification will not create a dead letter, but will in-
stead reflect a genuine, well-considered commitment by the American 
people to the principles of the Covenant.255  
The U.S. popular affection for civil and political rights provides ad-
ditional opportunities for argument in support of ICESCR ratification. 
Despite the separation of the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights from the ICESCR, and rhetoric that has attempted to consign 
the two forms of rights to distant islands, the dichotomy is a false one. 
The interdependence and indivisibility of civil and political rights and 
economic and social rights was a defining feature of the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights,256 and is a well-settled tenet of international 
law. 257 The connection is also inescapably logical: starving children, 
mothers who do not survive childbirth due to lack of healthcare, and the 
desperately homeless cannot meaningfully exercise their rights to vote 
and free assembly. Amartya Sen’s well-known assertion that a famine is 
unlikely to occur in a representative democracy with a free press is his 
illustration of the value of civil and political rights to economic and so-
cial well-being.258 But Sen and others have also cautioned that the exis-
253 See supra notes 212–225; see also Lindsay v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) 
(“We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary housing. But the Con-
stitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill.”).  But see 
LAWRENCE SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
PRACTICE 84–102 (2004) (arguing that there exist “judicially underenforced” economic 
and social norms in U.S. constitutional law).  
254 See Michelman, supra note 245, at 673 (“Of course, it is true that each person, 
acting alone or in voluntary collaboration with others, can try in good faith to define and 
fulfill his or her individual, equitable obligation to aid the needy, regardless of what oth-
ers in a position to help may or may not do. But frustration surely awaits whoever makes 
the attempt, and the argument seems very strong that our efforts along those lines are 
most effectively and satisfyingly directed toward inducing the state to tax us and others 
in order to pay for activities along the lines envisioned by FDR.”). 
255 Alston, supra note 195, at 392–93 makes a similar argument. 
256 See Indivisibility and Interdependence of Economic, Social, Cultural, Civil, and 
Political Rights, G.A. Res. 44/130, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. 
A/Res/44/130, at 209 (Dec. 15, 1989).  
257 See Vienna Declaration, supra note 200, § 5, at 5; International Conference on 
Human Rights, Proclamation of Tehran, ¶13, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/41 (Apr. 22–May 
13, 1968); See also Craig Scott, Interdependence and Permeability of Human Rights 
Norms: Towards a Partial Fusion of the International Covenants on Human Rights, 27 
OSGOOODE HALL L.J. 769, 779–90 (1989). 
258 Amartya Sen, Freedoms and Needs, 210 NEW REPUBLIC 31, 33–34 (1994). 
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tence of democracy is no guarantee of full economic and social rights.259 
As professor Frances Stewart has said, “Capitalist democratic states put 
the emphasis on the private sector, which does not always deliver on so-
cial goods. The free press is good on major disasters like classic famines, 
but it tolerates chronic hunger as much as anyone else.”260 Stated in a 
more positive way, democracy and economic and social rights are inter-
dependent.261 Recognizing this interdependency, western democracies 
other than the United States embrace economic and social rights along-
side similar civil and political rights commitments in their constitutions, 
their court decisions, and in their ratification of both the ICESCR and 
ICCPR.262 It is no coincidence that, compared to the United States, these 
same nations devote a greater percentage of their gross domestic product 
to meeting social needs, have lower poverty rates, and endure less in-
equality.263 
2.   Economic and Social Rights are Justiciable in the United States 
In terms of justiciability, the two forms of rights also resist neat divi-
sion. The standard Isaiah Berlin characterization of civil and political 
rights as negative rights and economic and social rights as positive rights 
has some broad validity,264 but it is inaccurate to say that the state does 
not incur substantial obligations in the protection of civil and political 
rights. A partial list of the substantial governmental undertakings to pro-
tect civil and political rights in the United States and elsewhere would 
include criminal courts, civil courts, jails and prisons, police officer hir-
ing and training, government systems for recording and protecting pri-
vate property, and extensive election apparatus.265 Although it has been 
259 See generally id.; World Conference on Human Rights, Statement to the World 
Conference on Human Rights on Behalf of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1992/2 (December 7, 1992) (“[T]here is, however, no 
basis whatsoever to assume that the realization of economic, social and cultural rights 
will necessarily accompany, or result from, the realization of civil and political rights.”). 
260 Michael Massing, Does Democracy Avert Famine?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2003), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/01/arts/does-democracy-avert-famine.html.  
261 Karl Klare, Critical Perspectives on Social and Economic Rights, Democracy, 
and Separation of Powers, in SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: 
CRITICAL INQUIRIES 1, 4 (Helena Alviar García et al. eds., 2015) (“[D]emocracy and SER 
[social and economic rights] are mutually constitutive – social and economic rights that 
are in some sense constitutionally binding are of the essence of democracy.”) (emphasis 
omitted). See also Deval Desai, “Courting" Legitimacy: Democratic Agency and the 
Justiciability of Economic and Social Rights, 4 INTERDISC. J. HUM. RTS. L. 29, 42, 46 
(2010) (widespread absence of economic and social well-being among the polity under-
cuts the democratic legitimacy of the state). 
262 Alston, supra note 195, at 375–76. See also Glendon, supra note 181, at 519. 
263 See Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, supra note 4, at 
65, 67, 217; Gould & Wething, supra note 24, at 2–6; Denk et al., supra note 24, at 13. 
264 See Berlin, supra note 8, at 121–22. 
265 See HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN 
POLICY 37–38 (1996).  
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argued that economic and social rights are too complex for courts to rule 
on, adjudication of civil and political rights is often not a straightforward 
task either. 266 Assessing the competing interests involved in a prisoner’s 
claim to being subject to cruel and unusual punishment or a student’s 
complaint of due process violations in public school expulsion, for ex-
ample, are daunting for any court. 267 
Yet these U.S. judges muddle through civil and political rights cases 
like these, and find a way to provide remedies when appropriate and to 
defer to the other branches of government when that discretion is called 
for.268 They can do the same for economic and social rights. Despite ar-
guments to the contrary, courts in the United States possess both the legi-
timacy and the competency to enforce the requirements of the ICESCR.  
The opportunity to be heard and receive a ruling is at the core of 
rights enforcement, and the judicial branch of government is procedural-
ly best suited for that role.269 Courts are often the most appropriate subs-
tantive fit as well. Arguments that courts lack legitimacy to adjudicate 
economic and social rights claims do not square with the U.S. courts’ 
proud tradition as the branch of government that is most protective of the 
rights of individuals who are not members of majority ethnic, religious, 
or economic groups.270 If majoritarian decision-making is properly re-
strained by courts in the event of racial discrimination271 or persecution 
of minority religious groups,272 shouldn’t courts also be entrusted to de-
fend the rights of the minority who are politically marginalized due to 
hunger, homelessness, and lack of health care?273  
266 See Bork, supra note 237, at 700; Cross, supra note 237, at 900–24.  
267 See, e.g., Holly Boyer, Home Sweet Hell: An Analysis of the Eighth Amendment's 
‘Cruel And Unusual Punishment’ Clause as Applied to Supermax Prisons, 32 SW. U. L. 
REV. 317, 332–33 (2003); Donald H. Stone & Linda S. Stone, Dangerous & Disruptive 
or Simply Cutting Class; When Should Schools Kick Kids to the Curb?: An Empirical 
Study of School Suspension and Due Process Rights, 13 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 2–7 (2011). 
268 Klare, supra note 261, at 19 (Courts determining when and whether to overrule 
legislative and executive decisions is not a new phenomenon: “The adoption of binding 
SER [social and economic rights] complicates but does not create the occasion or need 
for balancing exercises. That happened ages ago when reviewing courts first held that 
legislative action intruded impermissibly on fundamental rights.”). 
269 See Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 166, § 5. 
270 See Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940) (courts are “havens of refuge 
for those who might otherwise suffer because they are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or 
because they are nonconforming victims of prejudice and public excitement”). But see 
BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE 
SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009) (arguing that 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s countermajoritarian reputation is not fully deserved).  
271 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
272 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).  
273  See Frank Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 
WASH. U. L. Q. 659, 678 (1979) (“To be hungry, afflicted, ill-educated, enervated, and 
demoralized by one's material circumstances of life is not only to be personally disadvan-
taged in competitive politics, but also, quite possibly, to be identified as a member of a 
group — call it ‘the poor’— that has both some characteristic political aims and values 
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It is possible that the political branches of the U.S. government will 
reliably protect economic and social rights post-ratification of the 
ICESCR, especially with the intervention of civil society pushing for 
such protections.274 But the influence of campaign contributions and 
lobbying by wealthy individual and corporate supporters,275 along with 
non-representative legislative apportionment due to electoral district ger-
rymandering,276 calls into question the political branches’ reliability in 
protecting economic and social rights. Deval Desai argues that the judi-
ciary has a role to play in the interpretation and enforcement of econom-
ic and social rights when the other branches of government are not truly 
representative of the polity due to the limited agency of those living in 
grinding poverty.277 Devai focuses his analysis on developing countries, 
but notes that the need for judicial oversight of economic and social 
rights in the United States is suggested by the sheer percentage of the 
population living below the poverty line and without essentials such as 
healthcare.278 
Similarly, arguments that courts lack competency to adjudicate eco-
nomic and social rights do not account for the adversarial legal process’ 
ability to produce robust fact-finding and generate creative and effective 
remedies.279 In the judicial setting, expert witnesses, documentary evi-
dence, amicus curiae (friend of the court) and third-party interveners, 
along with courts’ capacity to appoint special masters and other expert 
adjudicators, all supplement the testimony of the directly-affected indi-
viduals and the arguments of counsel challenging every factual and legal 
and some vulnerability to having its natural force of numbers systematically subordi-
nated in the processes of political influence and majoritarian coalition-building.”). 
274 See, e.g., Social Movements and Grassroots Groups, INT’L NETWORK FOR ECON., 
SOC. & CULTURAL RIGHTS, http://www.escr-net.org/node/365085 (last visited Sept 18, 
2015) (ESCR advocacy group mobilizing civil society to push for realization of ESCR 
rights); Neier, supra note 9, at 7 (Neier argues that the driving force behind decades of 
human rights protection has been nongovernmental advocacy organizations). 
275 See Lynda W. Powell, The Influence of Campaign Contributions in State Legis-
latures (2012); John Craig & David Madland, How Campaign Contributions and Lobby-
ing Can Lead to Inefficient Economic Policy, Ctr. for Am. Progress 3 (May 2, 2014), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/report/ 
2014/05/02/88917/.  
276 See Sam Wang, The Great Gerrymander of 2012, N.Y. Times (Feb. 2, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/opinion/sunday/the-great-gerrymander-of-
2012.html?pagewanted=all (“Democrats received 1.4 million more votes for the House 
of Representatives in 2012, yet Republicans won control of the House by a 234 to 201 
margin.”).  
277 Desai, supra note 261, at 29–30.  
278 Id. at 47. 
279 For example, economic rights disputes are adjudicated in a judicial-style process 
in multilateral trade agreements, including General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO). See Patricia Isela Hansen, Judicialization and Globalization in The North 
American Free Trade Agreement, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 489, 489–92 (2003). 
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contention.280 As a result, advocates litigating economic and social rights 
find that judicial review brings out information and analysis that were 
not present in the political branch process.281 
Any complaint that economic and social rights in the United States 
are vague compared to civil and political rights would be remedied by 
judicial interpretation of the Covenant on challenges brought by individ-
uals and civil society, just as decades of case law has given shape to the 
abstract notions of privacy rights, due process, and other constitutional 
liberty considerations.282 Indeed, studies have shown that courts review-
ing economic and social rights in other jurisdictions effectively balanced 
factors like resource limitations, popular demand, and infrastructure con-
cerns.283 
As that track record suggests, the question of courts’ competency to 
adjudicate economic and social rights is no longer a timely one. The 
matter is now well-settled, with courts and commissions reviewing 
claims and issuing orders regarding the right to clean water in Argenti-
na,284 the right to food and housing in Nigeria,285 the right to child care 
and employment in Finland, 286  the right to education for learning-
disabled students in Canada,287 the right to housing for internally dis-
placed persons in Colombia,288 the rights to subsistence grants for the 
280 See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Our Constitutionalized Adversary System, 1 
CHAP. L. REV..57 (1998) (“[T]he adversary system represents far more than a simple 
model for resolving disputes. Rather, it consists of a core of basic rights that recognize 
and protect the dignity of the individual in a free society.”). 
281 Nolan et al., supra note 250, at 14. 
282 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bills of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction 
(2000) (The notion of the Bill of Rights protecting individual rights, much less the mi-
nority from the majority, did not take root until 19th-century post-Civil War reconstruc-
tion and the adoption of the 14th Amendment); Peter Irons, The Courage of Their Con-
victions (1990) (accounts of sixteen different individuals who asserted their rights in 
cases that made constitutional law). 
283 Varun Gauri & Daniel M. Brinks, Introduction: The Elements of Legalization 
and the Triangular Shape of Social and Economic Rights, in COURTING SOCIAL JUSTICE: 
JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 1, 
5 (VARUN GAURI & DANIEL M. BRINKS eds., 2008). 
284  CApel.Civ., Neugen, sala II, 19/5/1997, Expte.311-CA-1997, “Menores 
Comunidad Paynemil s/acción de amparo”(Arg), www.escr-net.prg/docs/i/405963.  
285 SERAC and CESR v. Nigeria African Commission on Human Rights, [2002], 
Case No. 155/96, Decision made at 30th Ordinary Session, Banjul, The Gambia, from 
13th to 27th October 2001. Summary available at http://www.escr-net.org/docs/i/404115. 
286 KKO 1997: 141 (Employment Act Case) Yearbook of the Supreme Court 1997 
No. 141(Supreme Court of Finland), Case No. S 98/225 (Child-Care Services Case) Hel-
sinki Court of Appeals 28 October 199; For English summaries of these and a wide range 
of other ESR cases, see CENTER ON HOUSING RIGHTS AND EVICTIONS, LEADING CASES ON 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: SUMMARIES 44–45 (2009), 
http://www.cohre.org/sites/default/files/leading_esc_rights_cases_24_april_2009.pdf. 
287 Moore v. British Columbia, [2012] S.C.R. 61 (Can.). 
288 Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], enero 22, 2004, Sentencia T-
025/2004 (Colom.), www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/ 
Papers/2009/11/judicial%20protection%20arango/Annexes.PDF. 
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unemployed in Germany, 289 to name just a few of dozens of exam-
ples.290 Professor Lucy Williams conducted an analysis of thirty two 
economic and social rights decisions from eight national jurisdictions 
and found the courts sometimes aggressively ordering the provision of 
social goods and “[m]uch less preoccupied with [separation of powers] 
concerns than academics and traditional jurists in the older constitutional 
democracies may imagine.” 291 Any notion that economic and social 
rights are a mere paper tiger were put to rest long ago, as evidenced in 
particular by sweeping decisions by courts in India and South Africa. 
In the case of People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, 
the Supreme Court of India was presented with claims based on the In-
dian government retaining a food surplus even as its citizens were suffer-
ing from a severe famine. 292 Citing Article 21 of the Constitution of In-
dia, which protects every citizen’s right to live with human dignity, the 
Court ordered the government to carry out food and employment pro-
grams, including school meals and provision of grain at reduced prices to 
impoverished families.293 Implementation of the orders, which involved 
millions of tons of grain and the expenditure of billions of rupees, was 
overseen by court-appointed commissioners.294 The court’s ruling and 
implementation is considered to have saved thousands of lives.295 As one 
commentator observed about the Indian case and a Colombian Constitu-
tional Court’s orders for health care and housing for displaced persons, 
“In both cases, the court took on massive issues that the political 
branches had basically ignored and constructed public policy from the 
ground up.”296 
The South African Constitutional Court has generated a body of law 
on economic and social rights that illustrates both the rights’ justiciabili-
ty and the Court’s exercise of restraint by leaving some decisions to the 
political branches of government. The Court’s most celebrated decision, 
Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign, relied on the right to 
healthcare services articulated in the South African Constitution to com-
pel the government to provide the anti-retroviral medicine nevirapine to 
289 Hartz IV, BVerfGE 1BvL 10/10, 9.2.2010, Absatz-Nr. (1-220) (Ger.).  
290 Among the volumes that include summaries of court decisions involving eco-
nomic and social rights are INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, COURT AND THE 
LEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (2008); Gauri & 
Brinks, supra note 283; Albisa & Schultz, supra note 138; CENTER ON HOUSING RIGHTS 
AND EVICTIONS , supra note 286.  
291 Lucy A. Williams, Resource Questions in Social and Economic Rights Enforce-
ment, in SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 60 (Helena Garcia et 
al., 2014).  
292 Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 of 2001 (May 2, 2003) (interim order) (India), 
https://www.escr-net.org/docs/i/401033. 
293 Id. 
294 Id. 
295 Id. 
296 Landau, supra note 236, at 449. 
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HIV-positive mothers and their babies at childbirth. 297  A 2003 decision 
about housing rights in South Africa v. Grootboom favorably cited the 
housing rights in South Africa’s constitution and the ICESCR.298 But the 
Grootboom decision was less prescriptive than the Treatment Action 
Center order, allowing the government significant leeway in implement-
ing a plan to respect housing rights and declining to order specific relief 
for the plaintiff.299 In the Court’s 1998 decision in Soobramoney v. Mi-
nister of Health, the Court refused to order the government to provide 
renal dialysis that was essential to the plaintiff’s survival, citing the 
state’s constitutional obligation to take only the actions that are possible 
within its available resources.300“[T]he State’s resources are limited,” 
the Court wrote. “[T]here are also those who need access to housing, 
food and water, employment opportunities, and social security.”301 Iron-
ically, despite the high-profile nature of the South African Constitutional 
Court’s economic and social rights jurisprudence, and the fears of some 
commentators that courts will overreach in deciding cases involving 
economic and social rights, the Court has been criticized for not being 
proactive enough in making those rights meaningful for the country’s 
poor.302  
Even in the absence of specific economic and social rights in its fed-
eral constitution, U.S. courts are no stranger to these types of cases. 
Structural injunction remedies like those issued in the People’s Union for 
Civil Liberties and Treatment Action Center cases, and the civil society 
pressure that created and sustained the litigation, have their analogs in 
U.S. court decisions addressing challenges to prison conditions,303 pub-
lic school financing,304 access to shelter for homeless persons,305 and 
housing discrimination.306 Just like People’s Union for Civil Liberties 
297 Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) 
(S. Afr.).  
298 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v. Grootboom and 
Others 2001(1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
299 Id. 
300 Soobramoney v. Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) 
(S. Afr.). 
301 Id. at para. 31. 
302 See, e.g., Landau supra note 236, at 197–98; David Bilchitz, Giving Socio-
Economic Rights Teeth: The Minimum Core and its Importance, 119 S. AFR. L. J. 484, 
491 (2002); Sandra Liebenberg, South Africa in SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: 
EMERGING TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 137, at 90. 
303 See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 563 US 493 (2011); Bailey W. Heaps, The Most Ade-
quate Branch: Courts as Competent Prison Reformers, 9 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. 
LIBERTIES 281, 281 (2013). 
304 See, e.g., Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); 
Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989). 
305 See Ctr. Twp. of Marion Cty. v. Coe, 572 N.E.2d 1350, 1354 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1991). 
306 See, e.g., S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 
(1983).  
                                                                                                                      
2016] Proposal for Remedying Charity/Justice Imbalance 85 
and Treatment Action Center, the U.S. court decision of the 20th century 
with arguably the most historical impact, Brown v. Board of Education, 
was spurred by civil society pressure and featured a challenging structur-
al injunction that pushed the political branches of government beyond 
their majoritarian comfort zone.307 
F.   The U.S. Post-Ratification of the ICESCR 
Ratification of the ICESCR will not instantly transform the United 
States into a social justice paradise, as is demonstrated by both the “pro-
gressive realization” language of the ICESCR and the significant gap 
between the current state of economic and social rights in the U.S. and 
the terms of the Covenant.308 But change will come. It took generations 
of effort to transform the U.S. Constitution’s Bill of Rights into tangible 
protections for the rights of all human beings to be free from slavery, 
much less possess the rights to vote, to be free from non-discrimination, 
or receive a fair trial.309 In many of these civil and political arenas with-
in the United States, the struggle continues.310  In the context of eco-
nomic and social rights, determined and creative advocates will need to 
persuade principled, empathetic judges and lawmakers to translate the 
ambitious words of the ICESCR into realizable rights for the suffering 
poor of the United States.311 
The good news for those advocates is that, post-ratification of the 
ICESCR, they will have a structure to work with new and powerful tools 
at their disposal.312 Within two years of ratifying the ICESCR, the Unit-
307 See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 523–39 (1976) (describing the NAACP’s 
role in pushing U.S. school desegregation litigation and legislative and executive branch 
resistance to integration). 
308 See KLARE, supra note 260, at 5–6 (“Human rights texts do not build houses, es-
tablish schools, or deliver food . . . Human rights are normative and discursive resources 
in struggle, not magic wands.”).  
309 See Amar, supra note 282.    
310 See, e.g., Veasey v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 9, 12 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(Writing in dissent of the denial of request to stay application of Texas voter identifica-
tion law, the strictest in the nation, Justice Ginsburg wrote, “The greatest threat to public 
confidence in elections in this case is the prospect of enforcing a purposefully discrimi-
natory law, one that likely imposes an unconstitutional poll tax and risks denying the 
right to vote to hundreds of thousands of eligible voters.”). 
311 See Ian Johnstone, Law-Making Through the Operational Activities of Interna-
tional Organizations, 40 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 87, 105 (2008) (A principle value of 
human rights treaties is offering a framework for “naming and shaming” violators of the 
guarantees); Shareen Hertel, Legal Mobilization: A Critical First Step to Addressing 
Economic and Social Rights, OPENGLOBALRIGHTS (Nov. 27, 2014), 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/shareen-hertel/legal-mobilization-
critical-first-step-to-addressing-economic-and-so (There does not need to be a choice 
between legal mobilization and grassroots mobilization: “Elite-level legal strategies 
(connected to People’s Union for Civil Liberties in India), moreover, support the harder, 
grassroots work of expanding popular consciousness and improving service delivery.”). 
312 See Beth Simmons, What’s Right With Human Rights, 35 DEMOCRACY (Winter, 
2015), http://www.democracyjournal.org/35/whats-right-with-human-rights.php (“Trea-
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ed States will be required to submit to the ESCR Committee a report on 
its current compliance and plans for progressive realization of the rights 
in the Covenant.313 Reports will be due every five years thereafter, and 
the Committee will pose questions after reviewing each report.314  Ad-
vocates who have long decried the U.S. record of failing to respect eco-
nomic and social rights315 will have an opportunity to review the state 
reports and then submit their own assessments to the Committee.316 Of 
course, simply filing reports does not discharge the U.S. obligations un-
der the Covenant. The United States will be expected to show both a 
plan and tangible steps toward full realization of the promised economic 
and social rights.317  
At present, U.S. lawmakers often explain away the neglect of eco-
nomic and social needs by citing domestic budget constraints.318  But 
that approach is not likely to be successful in the ICESCR review 
process. In 2007, the ESCR Committee made clear that its analysis of 
whether a government was using maximum available resources to comp-
ly with its obligations would include a process of comparing economic 
and social rights-related expenditures to expenditures for non-economic 
and social rights-related areas. 319 The Committee said it would also 
compare a treaty party’s expenditures in a Covenant-related area, such as 
education and health, with expenditures in the same area by countries at 
a comparable level of development. 320 A U.S. argument of inability to 
meet its Covenant obligations would likely not stand up well to such 
scrutiny, given its comparative wealth, low tax burden for high-income 
ties change politics—in particular, the domestic politics of the ratifying country . . . [t]he 
most important resource a ratified treaty provides is legitimacy, which in turn can be 
parlayed into further [domestic] political support.”).  
313 Provisional Rules of Procedure Adopted by the Committee at its Third Session, 
supra note 159, at 58. 
314 Id. 
315 See, e.g., National CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR 
ALL: PASTORAL LETTER ON CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND THE ECONOMY 43 (1986), 
http://www.usccb.org/upload/economic_justice_for_all.pdf (“The principle of social 
solidarity suggests that alleviating poverty will require fundamental changes in social 
and economic structures that perpetuate glaring inequalities and cut off millions of citi-
zens from full participation in the economic and social life of the nation.”). 
316 See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 161. 
317 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 8 at 
art. 2, ¶ 1–3. 
318 See, e.g, Nicholas Johnson, Phil Oliff and Erica Williams, An Update on State 
Budget Cuts: At Least 46 States Have Imposed Cuts That Hurt Vulnerable Residents and 
the Economy, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (Feb. 9, 2011), 
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=1214 (“With tax revenue still declining as a 
result of the recession and budget reserves largely drained, the vast majority of states 
have made spending cuts that hurt families and reduce necessary services.”). 
319 Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights., An Evaluation of the Obliga-
tion to Take Steps to the “Maximum of Available Resources” Under An Optional Proto-
col To The Covenant, U.N. Doc E/C.12/2007/1 (Sept. 21, 2007). 
320 Id. 
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individuals and corporations, and extensive expenditures on programs 
like the military.321 
The Committee is likely to expect the United States to use its signif-
icant national resources to promptly honor the obligation to provide its 
residents with the “minimum core” of economic and social rights, in-
cluding food, primary health care, shelter and housing, and education.322 
Advocates will be pushing in the domestic budgeting process for suffi-
cient allocations to address these needs, many of which have gone unmet 
for millions of Americans for generations.323 As noted in Section II 
above, adjustments to current tax policy will be called for, as will a re-
duction in the massive U.S. expenditures on the military.324 
Advocates can also push at multiple levels for direct enforcement of 
the ICESCR. The Optional Protocol of 2008, which entered into force in 
2013, allows for the Committee to employ a quasi-judicial proceeding to 
receive and review individual complaints of non-compliance with the 
Covenant. 325   In addition, it seems inevitable that alleged non-
compliance with the ICESCR will be the subject of domestic litigation, 
coupled with civil society advocacy in multiple forums.326 The success 
of such litigation would be predicated on the resolution of current ques-
tions about the existence of a treaty-based private right of action in U.S. 
courts, a resolution that would recognize that treaties can only be legiti-
mate if they are enforceable, and that the U.S. Constitution’s Article VI 
characterization of treaties as the “supreme law of the land” means what 
it plainly states.327  Courts are likely to entertain requests for economic 
321 See OECD FACTBOOK supra notes 5–6 (comparing U.S. social welfare spending 
in comparison with similar countries); see also Federal Budget Priorities, American 
Friends Service Committee, http://afsc.org/key-issues/issue/federal-budget-priorities 
(“Military spending accounts for 57 percent of the U.S. discretionary federal budget. The 
entrenched culture of militarism, the defense lobby, U.S.-led military interventions 
across the globe, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have had untold human and finan-
cial costs, depleting U.S. resources for human needs.”). 
322 See Comm. on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 165. 
323 See, e.g., Andrew Fieldhouse and Rebecca Thiess, The ‘Back to Work’ Budget: 
Analysis of the Congressional Progressive Caucus Budget for Fiscal Year 2014, ECON. 
& POLICY INST. (March 13, 2013), http://www.epi.org/publication/back-to-work-budget- 
analysis-congressional-progressive/. 
324 See, e.g., Federal Budget Priorities, supra note 321. 
325 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultur-
al Rights, supra note 162. 
326 Ayman Sabae, Four Strategic Pathways for the Realization of the Right to Health 
Through Civil Society Actions: Challenges and Practical Lessons Learned in the Egyp-
tian Context, 16 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 104, 115 (2014), http://cdn2.sph.harvard.edu/wp-
content/uploads/sites/13/2014/12/Sabae-final.pdf (efforts to guarantee the right to health 
to all Egyptians included legislative proposals, public advocacy, coalition building and 
litigation, with the approaches complementing each other).  
327 See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 513–14 (2008) (majority of Supreme Court 
stating that treaties do not create a private right of action in U.S. courts); Oona Hathaway 
et al., International Law at Home: Enforcing Treaties in U.S. Courts, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 
51, 90–105 (2012) (offering proposals for treaty enforcement in U.S. courts). 
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and social rights structural injunctions, which have been proven in both 
multi-case studies328 and notable individual examples329 to have a posi-
tive impact on the lives of people struggling to enforce their economic 
and social rights. Brown v. Board of Education provided the 20th century 
with its U.S. landmark human rights structural injunction decision. Its 
21st century equivalent may look more like the sweeping, lifesaving rul-
ings in People’s Union for Civil Liberties and Treatment Action Center. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States’ charity/justice imbalance is not just an artifact of 
the nation’s history and culture. It is a product of the nation’s laws.330 As 
my long-ago Legal Services client struggling with poverty and disability 
discovered, our wealthy country allows millions of its residents to suffer 
from inadequate food, shelter, and health care. This suffering is caused in 
part to an ill-advised provision that is present in the law—the charitable 
tax deduction, which does not effectively address economic and social 
needs, forces an inequitable poverty relief and tax burden on the middle 
class, and lulls the population—including the judge who ruled against 
my unfortunate client—into a false sense of complacency about its po-
verty crisis. The suffering is also caused by a notorious hole in U.S. law, 
the lack of enforceable economic and social rights.  The United States 
can remedy its charity/justice imbalance by removing the charitable tax 
deduction and replacing it with ratification of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Under this two-part approach, 
charity would take a step back. Justice would take a step forward.  
And yes, judge, there will be a program for people like her. 
 
 
328 See Landau, supra at 237–38. 
329 See notes 291–301 (India and South Africa examples of impactful structural in-
junctions on economic and social rights). 
330 See Klare, supra note 261, at 6. (“Rights, legal practices, and legal outcomes are 
not autonomous forces organizing social life, but neither are they entirely determined by 
social structures independent of law. Legal practices can sometimes disrupt the ideologi-
cal or institutional status quo and unleash transformative dynamics.”) (citation omitted). 
                                                                                                                      
